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Iraq is a country with exceptional natural resource wealth, but also consistent political turbulence manifested by 
high levels of state corruption, patronage networks, weak governance, poor institutional quality, civil unrest and 
sectarian conflict, all of which have undermined the sovereignty of its vast petroleum wealth and limited its potential 
for economic prosperity. As a mechanism for reducing the high levels of corruption and patronage networks as well 
as stimulating economic activity, this dissertation proposes the use of citizen-based direct distribution of oil revenues 
and studies the economic impacts of this policy using Social Accounting Matrix analysis. 
The methodology for this analysis includes testing the policy at different levels of per capita distribution, as well as 
with three variations in the design of the distribution programs. These variations include a universal cash transfer 
funded by oil revenue surpluses, a targeted cash transfer funded by oil revenue surpluses and a universal cash 
transfer funded by the reallocation of funding from the existing food subsidy system. The results illustrate that in 
each of the scenario variations, cash transfers are shown to have a significant positive impact on household incomes, 
producing activities and aggregate demand in the economy. The results also illustrate a net welfare gain to 
households when replacing the existing food subsidy system with cash transfers.   
In the comparison of distribution variations, targeted programs are shown to have the largest effect on the economy, 
primarily as lower-income households were allocated a greater proportion of income and subsequently also spend 
a greater proportion of their income on goods with lower leakages. Higher-income households, who are non-
recipients in the targeted programs, benefit from targeted programs through the indirect/induced effects, which are 
largest in comparison to the other distribution variations.  The results also show increased consumption on essential 
goods & services, primarily agricultural produce, which would ease concerns that cash transfers may generate 
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1.1 INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND 
The presence of significant natural resource endowments has made Iraq considerably wealthy, but also 
simultaneously contributed to a history of political instability and sectarian violence. Iraq’s vast hydrocarbon wealth 
has not only extensively shaped the dynamics of the economic environment but has also exerted considerable 
influence over political, social and cultural elements in the country. While resource-based wealth offers potentially 
beneficial opportunities, it also poses extensive and complex challenges to a country. The natural resources of a 
country are the sovereign property of its citizens. When managed efficiently, potential exists to develop a 
competitive advantage and stimulate economic growth and development. However, corrupt governments often 
seek to prioritize the exploitation of natural resources for the consolidation of power and private gain, and ultimately 
descend into authoritarianism, internal conflict and economic stagnation, as manifested by recent events in Iraq 
(Wahab, 2015). As a mechanism for reducing the high levels of corruption as well as stimulating economic activity, 
this dissertation proposes the use of citizen-based direct distribution of oil revenues and studies the economic 
impacts of this policy using Social Accounting Matrix analysis. 
Iraq has largely been the victim of a lingering legacy of corruption and patronage, epitomized primarily by the rule 
of Saddam Hussain and the Ba’athist party. Government corruption in Iraq facilitated the diversion of natural 
resource revenues into private holdings, primarily into the coffers of senior Ba’athist party members and patronage 
networks (key proponents) of the Ba’athist party’s rule. The U.S.-led incursion of Iraq in 2003, which resulted in the 
ousting of Saddam Hussain and the Ba’athist party saw the birth of a new political system in Iraq, where political 
parties contest in elections and federalism offers sub-national groups, specifically the Kurdish Regional Government 
(KRG), more autonomy (Wahab, 2015). The power sharing system installed by the U.S., which guaranteed the 
dominant sections of society representation in the political system, proceeded to corrupt public offices and 
reinforced patterns of patronage, clientelism, and nepotism that have historically been prevalent throughout Iraqi 
history (Mahdy, 2016). All regions, irrespective of ethnic, cultural or religious orientation have demonstrated political 
and administrative fractures and weak public institutions, undermined by corruption and abuse of power, which has 
adversely affected growth and development in the country (Wahab, 2015). 
Iraq holds approximately 144 billion barrels of proven crude oil reserves (EIA, 2016). According to the US Energy 
Information Agency (EIA), these reserve holdings represented almost 18% of proven reserves in the Middle East and 
just fewer than 10% of global reserves (U.S EIA, 2016). Iraq’s oil production is centered around four major refineries; 
Erbil located in the semi-autonomous Kurdish region; Baiji located in the former militant insurgent occupied central 
region; Doura located near the capital and government strong hold of Baghdad and finally the Basrah plant, which 
is arguably the largest producing refinery and located in Southern Iraq, bordering Iran and Kuwait. The July 2014 




disrupted Iraq’s oil supply (U.S EIA, 2016). Despite an initial shock which saw production drop to a 2014 low of just 
over 3 million barrels a day, it quickly recovered and reached roughly 3.75 million barrels a day by the end of 2014.   
This is partially due to the oil producing capacity of the Baiji refinery being significantly less than the others, 
particularly the Doura and Basrah plants which account for more than 70% of oil production (U.S EIA, 2016). Despite 
a thriving oil sector, the remainder of Iraq’s economy outside of hydrocarbons has struggled to add any significant 
value to the Iraqi economy.  
When examining the paradox between Iraq’s vast oil wealth but chronic political and economic instability, it lends 
to the argument that Iraq suffers some of the effects of the natural resource curse. There is an abundance of studies 
on this phenomenon and proponents of it suggest that generally, over the long run, countries with a greater intensity 
of natural resource dependence demonstrate slower economic growth rates than resource-poor countries (Ross, 
2012, van der Ploeg, 2011 & Frankel, 2010). There are also many paths to which the resource curse has adverse 
developmental effects, such as weak and unstable political and economic institutions, rent-seeking activities and 
corruption (Mehlum et al., 2006,). There is also a tendency for entrepreneurship activities being marginalized, with 
key activities likely being concentrated among wealthy elites and patronage networks (Habibpour & Farzanegan, 
2014). 
Bjorvatn, Farzanegan & Schneider (2012) suggest that the probability of suffering some of the effects of the natural 
resource curse is also greater in sectarian societies and states. This is indeed relevant in the case of Iraq, where 
sectarianism has been a key motive for internal political conflicts, particularly in the post Saddam Hussein era. In 
more recent times, Iraq’s economy has demonstrated a strong recovery, primarily because of its extensive 
hydrocarbon reserves. However, despite its oil wealth, the non-resource economy remains relatively 
underdeveloped and incapable of creating enough jobs to sustain its increasing workforce. This has in-turn led to 
unemployment levels of at least 20%, and a per capita GDP that only regained its 1980 level in 2011 (Agator, 2013). 
Despite massive investments since the 2003 U.S invasion, Iraq continues to struggle with the efficient delivery of 
basic services, which has in-part contributed to 23% of Iraqis still living in absolute poverty (UN, 2013). 
Iraq’s substantial oil wealth has brought with it problems more severe than the resource curse literature dictates. 
The impacts of corruption and sectarian divides have become national and international security threats (Wahab, 
2015). The pillaging of Iraq’s natural resource wealth did not only contribute to state failure but also to the 
emergence of a militant insurgence in Iraq by the fanatic organization known as the Islamic State in Iraq and the 
Levant (ISIL) or Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). ISIS has received widespread focus since their much-publicised 
occupation of large swaths of territory in Iraq and Syria, most notably Iraq’s second largest city of Mosul. By means 
of illicit oil sales, smuggling and informal taxation, ISIS quickly established itself as the world’s wealthiest and most 
structured insurgent organization. The presence of ISIS has also led to large internal civilian displacements, as well 




occupied by ISIS. At the time of writing, Iraq had reclaimed all territory previously occupied by ISIS. With an uncertain 
future facing the Post-ISIS Iraq, the government face a defining period in their leadership, tasked with rebuilding 
broken institutions, mending sectarian divides and establishing security and stability.  
Despite the fight against ISIS creating a measure of unity among Iraq’s rival political parties and militant factions, the 
future of the post-ISIS Iraq remains unpredictable. Crucial to the rebuilding process will be the nature of the policies 
which are to be introduced, specifically those which seek to mitigate the adverse effects of the natural resource 
curse, eradicating socio-economic ills and facilitating greater inclusivity. One potential policy option which could 
address these elements is a citizen-based direct distribution of oil revenues. Discussions on the natural resource 
curse have progressively attracted more attention in the terrain of policy discussion, with a prominent proposal for 
avoiding some of the adversities that natural resource wealth can propagate being the direct distribution of resource 
rents to the population (Hertog, 2016). Citizen-based direct distribution of oil revenues addresses both the 
developmental and welfare effects of the natural resource curse. The direct distribution of resource revenues has 
acquired increasing prominence in international academia and policy discussions and has been debated to varying 
degrees in several literature pieces including Palley (2003); Birdsall and Subramanian (2004); Moss and Young 2009; 
Moss (2011); Segal (2012), Devarajan (2018) and Devarajan et al. (2011), to name a few. 
The successful implementation of a policy of direct distribution relies heavily on the synthesis which exists between 
the management, governance and administration of such a program. More importantly though, is the stability and 
political will of the government in facilitating these mechanisms. Gillies (2010) explains that in contexts where 
resource revenues represent a substantial portion of the economy, allocation decisions both determine and are 
determined by the prevailing political environment. Furthermore, the interplay between allocative decisions and 
politics is essential to understanding the policymaking environment, as well as the potential impacts which certain 
policies can have. It is important to note that a policy of direct distribution does not substitute the need for public 
investments into infrastructure, human capital, healthcare and education, rather it is a complimentary actor to 
provide the means to access different levels of goods and services.  
While the political leadership in Iraq has evolved, corruption and patronage networks remain deeply entrenched in 
the ethos. Direct distribution attempts to keep at least a portion of the countries natural resource wealth away from 
corrupt political elites, confers a more direct share in the management of these revenues to citizens, reduces 
corruption and imparts greater transparency and accountability on the government. Direct cash transfers to citizens 
can potentially catalyze a reduction in poverty, help to diversify the economy by creating demand for goods and 
services at all levels of income, stimulate capital formation, create domestic political constituency for transparency, 
facilitate popular pressure to discourage insurgency and protect the social contract between the government and 
its people (West, 2011). A policy of direct distribution can be implemented relatively quickly, with the subsequent 




complexities and if intended to be successful, will require intertemporal institutional stability, strict adherence to 
the rule of law and protection from all political pressure (Yacoub, 2015).  
1.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
This study aims to contribute to literature on public policy, as well as forming a platform for policy-orientated 
recommendations with respect to wealth distribution from Iraq’s petroleum sector. The primary focus of the 
background material seeks to provide a broader academic understanding as well as presenting evidence from the 
pre-and post-democratic era in the country on: (a) the importance of oil to the Iraqi economy, and (b) the 
mechanisms and extents to which the series of corrupt activities are executed. The key focus of this dissertation will 
be the nexus between the levels of corruption/patronage networks and the presence of vast natural resource wealth 
in Iraq, specifically, how political elites have in the past, and continue to exploit sovereign oil wealth for personal 
enrichment and the consolidation of power through various mechanisms. 
The above content establishes the foundation for the succeeding discussion on the direct distribution of resource 
revenues (specifically oil revenue surpluses), as a mechanism to reduce the magnitude of revenues available and 
subsequently lost to corruption, as well as providing a much-needed economic stimulus. Various pieces of past 
literature have studied cases of wealth distribution in other countries/states and have also proposed the use of this 
policy in the case of Iraq. However, few have analyzed this empirically in the case of Iraq.  This dissertation will 
provide an empirical analysis of wealth distribution in Iraq by modeling a citizen-based direct distribution of oil 
revenues on the Iraqi economy. The results of the model will provide an indication of the potential impacts on 
producing activities, household incomes and aggregate demand on the economy. Furthermore, the results of the 
analysis will be used for policy-orientated recommendations on whether direct distribution of oil revenues is a policy 
worth pursuing for Iraq. 
Owing to the above, the principal research questions for this dissertation are as follows: 
- How has the presence of significant resource wealth influenced the extent of corruption and patronage 
networks in Iraq? 
- Using a SAM analysis, what are the potential impacts on Output, GDP and Household Incomes when a policy 
of direct distribution of oil revenues is applied to the Iraqi economy? 
- Based on the results of the SAM analysis, is direct distribution of oil revenues a policy worth considering for 
Iraq? 
1.3 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 




Chapter 2 will comprise of three parts. Part 1 provides a conceptual framework with respect to the link between 
natural resources and the extent of corruption. Part 2 provides an overview of the Iraqi oil industry, focusing on 
governance, and presenting data which demonstrates the importance of oil to the economy. Governance aspects 
will discuss practices in the pre-and-post Saddam Hussain regime, focusing primarily on governance structures, the 
role of the Iraqi Oil Company (IOC) and agreements with the semi-autonomous Kurdistan region. Part 3 provides 
evidence related to the practices of corruption in Iraq in both the pre-and post Saddam Hussain regime. It will build 
up to the discussion of direct distribution by drawing a link between corruption and patronage networks, and the 
access to substantial oil revenues.  
Chapter 3 will focus primarily on the notion of direct distribution of oil revenues. It will look briefly at some of the 
existing work in this area, specifically those in the context of Iraq. The chapter will briefly define and discuss the 
variations in resource wealth management models for countries.  The chapter then presents a theoretical model for 
direct distribution, within the context of allocative efficiency and as a politically rational choice. It will discuss case 
studies of Alaska and Mongolia, both of which have implemented policies of direct distribution in the past. The 
experiences from Alaska and Mongolia also present cases of both success and failure with direct distribution.  
Chapter 4 will begin by discussing the narrative of distribution within the context of Iraq. It will then discuss the 
methodological approach for the study. It will outline the research methodology and explain the origins of the data 
to be used for the analysis. It will also discuss a range of assumptions which will be applied to the model in the 
empirical analysis. The chapter will then proceed with a presentation of the models simulated results and an 
interpretation thereof. The chapter will close with a presentation of the model limitations and how these may 
influence the results.  
Chapter 5 summarizes the findings of the analysis, with a specific focus on the feasibility of direct distribution in Iraq. 










 CHAPTER 2 
Oil wealth has been an omnipresent feature of the Iraqi economy throughout history. Under the various regimes, oil 
wealth has played a pivotal role in shaping Iraq’s development. At the same time, substantial oil wealth has also 
given rise to corruption and patronage networks, as important mechanisms for ruling elites to consolidate power. 
Studying the link between resource wealth and corruption provides valuable insights to the behavior of ruling 
governments in Iraq. The first part of this chapter will look conceptually at the nexus between corruption and natural 
resource wealth. The second part of this chapter will look briefly at Iraqi oil governance between 1916 & 2016. It will 
highlight the specifics regarding the awarding of the different concessionary contracts and the terms thereof. It will 
study data relating to production and rents of the oil industry, as well as how oil governance structures have changed 
since the advent of democracy. The last part of this chapter will discuss patronage networks and corruption in Iraq. 
It will focus on the mechanisms of patronage and corruption during the Saddam Hussein regime, and how they 
compare to those practiced since the advent of democracy.  
2.1 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: CORRUPTION & NATURAL RESOURCES 
Corruption, to varying degrees and forms occurs in almost every single country in the world. Historical trends suggest 
a prevalence and greater intensity of corruption in countries under certain conditions. One of the most significant 
of these conditions is the presence of an abundance of natural resource wealth. Various pieces of literature discuss 
the links between corruption and resource wealth, with a general consensus that when the possession of natural 
resources provides governments with substantial revenues, political elites are more likely to abuse their access to 
these revenues by engaging in corrupt practices, which in-turn undermine the authority of public institutions, 
specifically those which promote accountability and transparency (Liete & Weidmann 1999 and Collier & Venables 
2010). Corruption is one of the major reasons resource-rich economies perform poorly. The dominant forms of 
corruption in resource rich countries are rent-seeking and patronage networks. Resource rents encourage rent-
seeking as individuals compete for a share of these rents, while resource revenues also induce patronage funding as 
ruling elites seeking to consolidate power by enticing supporters through various incentives, most notably financial. 
These practices ultimately result in reduced accountability and inefficient allocation of state funds (Kolstad & 
Søreide, 2009).  
2.1.1 RENT SEEKING  
In the case of natural resources, rent-seeking refers broadly to the appropriation of resource rents without 
reciprocating any benefits to society through wealth creation or distribution. The concept of rent refers to the price 
difference at which an output from a resource can be sold and its respective extraction and production costs, 
including normal return (De Soysa & Neumayer, 2007).  At a governmental level, the concept of rent-seeking is 




its national revenues from the rents of sovereign natural resources (Beblawi & Luciani, 2016). When governments 
derive a substantial portion of revenues from natural resources, there is less incentive to raise revenues through 
conventional means such as taxation, but in turn also less incentive for citizens to monitor the activities of 
government and public officials. Karl (1997) and Leite & Weidmann (1999) find that the existence of large resource 
revenues nurtures economic incentives as well as opportunities for corrupt behaviour by government officials, 
specifically when accountability and transparency mechanisms are weak. The absence of these mechanisms 
therefore acts as an enabler through which resource rents contribute to corruption (Zhan, 2011). 
Consequently, the appropriation of revenues through rent-seeking becomes a means for political elites to exert 
influence and consolidate political power, at the expense of investments in growth and developmentally advancing 
elements. Ross (2001) finds that ruling elites are also likely to invest heavily in security apparatus, for the purposes 
of consolidating power by punishing dissidents and forcibly preventing the formation of social groups independent 
to the state. Karl (1997) presents evidence of this in the case of Venezuela, where the nationalization of the oil 
industry resulted in the shifting of resource rents to the state, and in-turn fostered a rent-seeking culture and patron-
client system of governance. Indeed, there are other examples of this experience, including in the case of Iraq, which 
will be studied more closely in the dissertation. 
The influence of substantial resource wealth in an economy also gives rise to efficiency losses resulting from the 
unproductive use of resources in the quest for rents. Hillman & Van Long (2017) suggests that corruption generates 
massive rents and entices individuals to participate in rent seeking activities through employment in unproductive 
public offices, from which rents can then be extracted. Mehlum et al. (2006) finds that in cases where resource rents 
are high and institutional quality is low, skilled agents and entrepreneurs are enticed by enhanced payoffs and would 
choose to be rent-seekers as opposed to productively employing their skills in other areas of the economy. This 
phenomenon mimics the concept of Brain Drain, however in this case of Iraq, it is not the migration of skilled workers 
to other regions, but rather to one sector (hydrocarbons). There are extensions to this which suggest that losses to 
national income can occur when the losses in production resulting from entrepreneurs departing this sector, exceeds 
the increase in income that natural resource rents generate (Kolstad & Søreide, 2009). Therefore, rent-seeking not 
only creates market distortions, it also reduces the size of the economy.  
2.1.2 PATRONAGE NETWORKS 
When ruling governments seek to consolidate political power, their support mechanisms play a critical role. In this 
instance, support mechanisms refer to special groups and networks of individuals who are loyal to the ruling party 
and who also tend to have hold considerable influence in economic, social and political spheres. More precisely 
these refer to wealthy business owners, ethnic, religious or community leaders and well-versed political 
representatives. These special groups are commonly referred to as patronage networks. There is a demonstrable 




provide political elites with the means to consolidate political power by attracting supporters with certain incentives 
(Kolstad & Søreide, 2009). This view is shared by Keller (2014) who suggests that the importance of patronage 
networks is such that ruling parties seeking to consolidate power are more likely to succeed with well-established 
patronage networks. Weak patronage networks are likely to be vulnerable to infiltration by opposing political 
groups. 
Nurturing patronage networks is diverse in practice and can be reached through both legal and illegal means.  From 
this perspective, the concepts of clientelism and nepotism can be looked at more closely. Clientelism refers broadly 
to the exchange of goods & services for political support, often between political actors and patronage networks, 
and is practiced both legally and illegally. In the current context, nepotism refers to the employment in public offices 
of individuals based on ethnic, religious or kin ties. With respect to clientelism, the illegal means are simple whereby 
political actors transfer appropriated resource rents directly to patronage networks. The legal means are more 
complex and diverse in their practice. For example, patrons who are business owners can be awarded huge 
government contracts, for which they are unlikely to be held accountable for if they do not deliver on the 
requirements. Also, patrons who are influential community leaders can be offered preferential services by state in 
exchange for ensuring that their respective communities remain loyal to the ruling regime. Nepotistic practices on 
the other hand are concerned primarily with allocating high paying, unproductive jobs, often to unqualified patrons 
or loyalists, in exchange for continued support to the ruling elites.  
Much like the case of rent-seeking, patronage networks also give rise to efficiency losses in the market. Inefficiencies 
in the allocation of public resources emerge when state funds are appropriated by political elites to fund patronage 
networks, when they could be spent in more productive ways such as investments into economic diversification, 
infrastructural needs and human capital development (Mahdy, 2016). The development of human capital is a 
particularly interesting dynamic when considering the concept of Brain Drain. Skilled workers who choose to be 
productive in non-resource sectors but recognize that there is little to no public investment in these sectors are likely 
to pursue opportunities abroad (if they do exist). Similarly, in the example of nepotistic practices when allocating 
positions in public offices, the state not only experiences real term losses from funds which are allocated to 
unproductive employment, but also the opportunity costs of a lost productive job which could have been allocated 





2.2 IRAQI OIL GOVERNANCE (1916 – 2003) 
2.2.1 FOREIGN OIL COMPANIES AND EARLY CONCESSIONARY CONTRACTS (1925 – 1958) 
Under monarchial rule, the production of Iraq’s oil was primarily operated by the Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC). 
The IPC was a majority British-owned energy company who were in existence between 1929 and 1972 (Wahab, 
2015). The IPC had evolved from the originally formed Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC), which was a conglomerate 
of German, Dutch, British and Turkish interests. The TPC was formed in 1914, and in 1925 was the recipient of the 
first concessionary oil contract in Iraq, with a 75-year duration. A revision of the original agreement was made in 
1931, which increased the area of coverage from 190 square miles to 35 000 square miles, effectively giving the IPC 
the right to explore all lands east of the Tigris River (Yacoub, 2015). In 1932, the Iraqi government awarded a 
secondary concessionary contract for oil exploration, this time to the British Oil Development Company (BODC), also 
with a 75-year duration. The move was largely viewed as an attempt to increase production and revenues by creating 
competition among the foreign firms. Under the terms of the second concessionary agreement, the BDOC were 
effectively given the right to explore all areas west of the Tigris River, approximately 46 000 square miles. 
The presence of the BDOC had understandably unsettled the IPC, and after consultation with the various 
stakeholders, the BDOC concession was transferred to the IPC in 1937 and later to the Mosul Petroleum Company 
(MPC), a subsidiary of the IPC. Subsidiaries of the IPC began to take a more central role in the Iraqi oil industry, 
particularly after 1937. In 1938, the Basrah Oil Company (BOC) was given a 75-year concessionary contract for all 
remaining areas not covered under the terms of any previously awarded concession. This area spanned 
approximately 93 000 square miles and though there was little activity in the early stages, the Basrah oilfields began 
producing and exporting in 1951 (Yacoub, 2015). Despite changes to revenue sharing in 1952, the absence of any 
operational oversight from the government in Iraq’s oil industry meant that they were not made privy to any 
information or figures relating to production, or rents which would accrue to the IPC. As a result, the Iraqi 
government and population alike had very little knowledge of the true potential of their countries natural resource 
wealth. The privacy of the IPC operations between 1925 & 1952 also partly explains why there are almost no reliable 
records of IPC profits before 1952, whilst production figures are available from 1934 onwards.   
Table 1 (below) provides a matrix of the terms of each concessionary contract per year in which they were agreed. 
The information asymmetries present in Iraq’s oil industry contributed significantly to the relatively low allocation 
of income to the government, both in absolute terms as well as percentage share of total net profit. The level of 
income earned by the government was also due to the level of production. Under the terms of the concessionary 
contracts, the government imposed no obligation on maintaining a specified level of production, or to increase 
production when more income was required. Since the IPC had deliberately maintained a low production level, 
government revenues were very low. Even after the increase in royalty payments from 4 to 6 shillings (gold) in 1950, 




TABLE 1: TERMS ON CONCESSIONARY CONTRACTS 
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Source: Extract from Yacoub (2015), Longrigo (1961), Issawi & Yeganeh (1961), Mikadashi (1966), Shwadran (1973). 
* Dead rent refers to the payment of fixed rent without consideration of profitability 
sharing agreement increasing the government’s revenues substantially, the IPC’s share of total net profits remained 
higher. Only after the 1958 revolution did government revenues begin to exceed IPC profits.  
Apart from the terms of Iraq’s concessionary contracts being favorable towards foreign oil companies, their high 
profitability was also due to lower production costs, higher productivity of the Iraqi oil fields and that on average, 
prices remained consistent with the price of crude oil in the Gulf of Mexico, which at the time was deemed to be 
high (Issawi and Yeganeh, 1962).  Even after increasing royalties, the Iraqi government was still unable to capture 
the excess rents. Further oversight in the terms of concessionary contracts meant that foreign oil companies also 
paid no taxes on profits. Taxes were solely dependent on exports and production. Since production was deliberately 
kept relatively low, taxes payable was fairly minimal (Yacoub, 2015). 
The terms of the concessionary contracts, which were largely unfavorable to the Iraqi government may not 
necessarily have been a result of oversight or omission during the negotiations. There are many reasons why 
concessionary contracts may have been intentionally advantageous towards to the British-owned oil companies. 
Given the politics of the time, Iraq was effectively under British control. Ergo rewarding of oil exploration contracts 




TABLE 2: IPC’S OIL PRODUCTION, PAYMENTS TO THE GOVERNMENT & NET PROFITS (1925-
1964) 






Ratio of Company 
Net Profits to 
Government Payment 
1925 - 0.35 - - 
1926 - 1 - - 
1927 - 1 - - 
1928 - 1 - - 
1929 - 1 - - 
1930 - 1 - - 
1931 - 401 - - 
1932 - 579 - - 
1933 - 742 - - 
1934 962,609 1,484 - - 
1935 3,581,953 1,009 - - 
1936 3,914,213 1,049 - - 
1937 4,137,824 1,251 -  
1938 4,162,939 1,896 - - 
1949 3,781,958 3,126 - - 
1950 6,160,765 6,781 - - 
1951 8,117,744 15,161 - - 
1952 18,060,803 40,740 44,448 1.091 
1953 27,220,199 51,449 57,224 1.112 
1954 29,615,569 68,517 74,496 1.087 
1955 32,716,227 73,824 79,239 1.073 
1956 30,606,282 69,165 74,239 1.073 
1957 21,361,979 51,523 54,182 1.051 
1958 34,931,461 84,604 61,809 0.730 
Source: Mikdashi, 1966 
* 1 long ton = 1.0161 metric ton 
** Payments by the IPC group are inclusive of inspection fees, tax commutation payments and scholarships awarded 
to Iraqi students. 
foreign firms would still have had some measure of involvement in Iraq’s oil exploration, be it operationally or just 
in an advisory role. This is primarily due to Iraq not having the experience or expertise to operate the oil industry.  
2.2.2 POST-INDEPENDENCE POLICY, BA’ATH PARTY LEADERSHIP & OIL INDUSTRY 
NATIONALISATION (1958 - 1979) 
The coming of the 1958 revolution saw the birth of the Iraqi Republic, led by General Abdu Al Karim Qassim. The 
period between 1958 & 1963 were largely dedicated to reviewing the concessionary contracts with the IPC’s, as well 
as negotiations regarding independence and administrative autonomy over areas populated by ethnic Kurds. 
However, General Qassim became increasingly undesirable as a leader and was ultimately assassinated in 1963. 
Politics between 1963 & 1968 was primarily dedicated to easing tensions with the Kurdish region. Little progress was 
however made, leading to the 1968 military coup and marking the beginning of the Ba’ath party leadership. Like the 
approach of their predecessors, in the early days of their leadership the Ba’ath party prioritized easing tension with 




other terms which included the recognition of Kurdish as an official Iraqi language, Kurdish political representation 
in the senior cabinet and the commitment to economic development of Kurdish areas, to name a few (Ghareeb, 
1981). An interesting observation, was the agreement allowing the Kirkuk locality to remain under control of the 
government for the time being, pending further negotiation. The settlement with the Kurdish region meant that the 
Ba’ath party could now focus on the definitive policy of their leadership: the nationalization of the Iraqi oil industry.   
The foundation for nationalization of the oil industry had already been laid with the establishment of the state-
owned Iraq National Oil Company (INOC) in 1964, prior to the Ba’ath party leadership. The government believed that 
to ensure that rents accrued to the government and not the foreign companies, the concessionary areas seized from 
the IPC required to be developed by a state-owned company (Yacoub, 2015). Governance of the INOC was fairly 
complex. Operations were overseen by a board of directors, all of whom were nonpartisan to the finance and 
administration. However, these appointments were all executed by presidential decree, with all decisions also 
requiring ministerial approval.   It is important to note that at this point, the industry had not been completely 
nationalized. The IPC continued to operate their oilfields and were still bound by service agreements. The key aspect 
of the INOC operations was that for the first time, the Iraqi government had a strong measure of operational 
oversight of the country’s oil industry. This was significant in that it placed production levels at the discretion of the 
state. Furthermore, the government could also now accurately determine the volume of Iraq’s oil reserves.  
Negotiations between the government and IPC continued, primarily regarding the reluctance of the IPC to expand 
production in its oilfields. In 1972, sighting no end to disputes with the IPC, the government took the decision to 
nationalize all of Iraq’s oil operations.  
The official nationalization of Iraq’s oil industry took place in 1974, after negotiating compensation with the IPC. 
Under the new law, the INOC was granted the exclusive rights to explore, develop and produce oil throughout Iraq. 
Through the INOC operations, Iraq drastically increased its exploratory efforts, which led to the finding of two 
massive oil fields, namely Majnoon and West Qurna (Stork, 1975). Predictably, post-nationalization saw the share of 
the oil industry in the economy (as a % of GDP) increase from 35% in 1970 to 60% in in 1974. Similarly, government 
revenues derived from the oil industry also rose from 52% in 1971 to 87% in 1976, while crude oil accounted for 98% 
of total exports in 1975 (Stork, 1975). Figure 1 (which follows) illustrates the sharp rise in oil revenues for selected 
periods between 1950 & 1980. Between 1972 & 1980, oil revenues in Iraq rose by more than US $25 billion. The 
sharp rise in revenues was a product of both a significant increase in production as well as the soaring price of crude, 
largely influenced by the Arab-Israeli war at the time. In addition to the transformation of the oil industry, there 
were many social and industrial reforms. Industrial reforms saw huge investments into iron, steel and 
petrochemicals industries (Cleveland, 2004). Other reforms included a reduction in taxes, the provision of subsidies 
for basic food items, the establishment of free health care and free Investments into Iraq’s economy, which also 




FIGURE 1: IRAQ OIL REVENUE FOR SELECTED YEARS BETWEEN 1950 & 1980 
 
Sources: Nyrop (1979), EIU (1980) & Cleveland (1981) 
These policies all contributed significantly to improvements in welfare levels for the population. Just as importantly 
for the government though, these reforms placed confidence in the ruling Ba’ath party and nullified support for any 
opposition. 
2.2.3 THE SADDAM HUSSAIN REGIME (1979 – 2003) 
Saddam Hussain officially became Iraqi president in 1979, having previously served as vice-president in the early 
days of the Ba’ath party leadership. Like many resource-rich countries governed by authoritarian regimes, Saddam 
Hussein utilized Iraq’s substantial oil revenues to fund networks of patronage and coerce any opposition or non-
proponents of the regime into submission, primarily through well-established security structures. It was a 
sophisticated system which was designed to consolidate power and co-opt support by punishing any dissidents and 
rewarding loyalty to the regime. His coming to power coincided with that of Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini, who fueled 
tension between Iran and the Iraqi government due to his unwavering support for Kurdish independence. More 
importantly though were the tensions born out of the religious divide between the Shia-led Iranian government and 
Sunni-led Iraqi government. This was however not the first occurrence of religious divides creating diplomatic 
tension between the two nations but was certainly the most profound. It epitomized the extent to which religious 
orientation influenced political agents in the Middle-East. The continued tension culminated with the coming of the 
Iran-Iraq war, lasting eight years between 1980 & 1988 and resulting in great economic and human losses for Iraq 
(Yacoub, 2015). The economic losses were primarily as a result of destruction to Iraq’s oil infrastructure. After 1980, 
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follows). 1980 was arguably the most destructive period of the war. Although the war had officially lasted for 8 years, 
after 1982 the conflict became less militarily dominated and more about finding a diplomatic solution. This was 
primarily attributed to the involvement of the United Nations. With the conflict now being less destructive, Iraq 
could restore the damaged its infrastructure and begin to expand production.   
FIGURE 2: IRAQ OIL PRODUCTION, EXPORTS & REVENUES, 1979 - 1988 
 
Sources: Cedano (2008) 
* Oil production & exports illustrated on primary axis, Oil revenues on secondary axis 
* MMBD = Million Barrels Per Day 
The end of the Iran-Iraq war was however not the end of Saddam Hussain’s onslaught in the region. In 1990, Iraq 
invaded Kuwait and declared its annexation. On this occasion, the conflict was specifically fueled by Kuwait 
producing oil above the OPEC treaty limit, and as a result adversely affecting (reducing) the global crude price as well 
as Iraq’s share of global oil exports (and subsequently revenue). In addition to this, Kuwait were accused of allegedly 
side-drilling under Iraqi soil to extract oil from the super-giant Rumaila oil field, located in southern Iraq (Basrah), 
approximately 20 miles from the Iraq-Kuwait border. The Gulf War conflict with Kuwait was more intense than that 
with Iran. Not only was some of Iraq’s oil infrastructure again damaged but also power supply systems, certain modes 
of the transport system, water and sewage networks were all destroyed. 
As punishment for the invasion of Kuwait, in 1990 the UN Security Council imposed widespread financial and trade 
sanctions on Iraq, most notably the banning of Iraqi oil exports (Wahab, 2015). Oil production dropped by more than 
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Council had made for provision to avert any humanitarian crisis by allowing Iraq, under the Oil-to-Food program to 
export US $1.6 billion in oil bi-annually to obtain humanitarian supplies. Between 1996 & 1999, this amount had 
grown from US $2 billion to US $8.3 billion (Sanford, 2003). The income from these exports were primarily used for 
food subsidies to be distributed to the Iraqi population. It is important to note that despite the sanctions, Saddam 
Hussain was still able to develop an intricate oil smuggling network which earned the regime additional funds and 
ultimately contributed to the consolidation of power (Wahab, 2015). This will be looked at more closely in the 
sections which  
FIGURE 3: IRAQ OIL PRODUCTION & EXPORTS, 1990 - 2003 
 
Sources: Cedano (2008), OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2004 
follow. After the conflict with Kuwait, much of the focus in Iraq was on negotiating an end to the sanctioned export 
quotas as well as renewed calls for greater Kurdish autonomy and control of the Kirkuk locality. On the 20th of March 
2003, the U.S and British invasion of Iraq effectively ended the reign of Saddam Hussain and the Ba’ath party. 
2.3 IRAQI OIL GOVERNANCE AFTER 2003 
Until today, Iraq in the post-Saddam Hussain era has been characterized by political fragmentation, ethno-sectarian 
violence and chronic instability. Political competition has adopted the conventional form of parties and elections, 
but also violent forms of sectarian conflict and insurrection (Wahab, 2015). Corruption and patronage networks are 
an ever-present feature but have evolved to become less centralized and more competitive. Despite a complete 
overhaul of the political system, governance and accountability remain weak. Furthermore, competition over access 
to oil revenues, coupled with political and administrative fragmentation has resulted in an undesirable propagation 
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a combination of transitional management authorities, the return of international oil companies and the regional 
sharing of oil revenues. Immediately after the fall of the regime, management and governance of Iraqi oil operations 
were placed exclusively under the control of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). The CPA comprised 
representatives from the US State Department, as well industry experts from US oil companies (Rutledge, 2005). 
Also included was a selection of exiled former high-ranking members of Iraqi Oil Ministry, and the leader of Iraq’s 
main opposition group at the time. It was intended than when the U.S left Iraq, the Iraqi representation on the CPA 
would facilitate a smooth transition of control of the oil industry to the first democratically elected government.  
Under guidance from the CPA, it was concluded that International Oil Companies (IOC) would again become active 
in Iraq’s oil operations, under the terms of a Production Sharing Contract (PSC). Under the terms of the PSC, the 
state would maintain ownership of the oil industry, while the IOC’s would act as service providers, receiving pre-
determined shares of production in return for services rendered. This period also witnessed the drafting of the TAL 
(Law of Administration for the State of Iraq or Transitional Administrative Law), which was to later form the basis of 
the permanent constitution, albeit an ambiguous and controversial one. Under the terms of the TAL, the Kurdish 
Regional Government (KRG) was given full administration rights over Kurdish areas, which included the long-
disputed Kirkuk locality. This meant that the Kurds would manage oil operations in the areas they controlled and be 
at liability to sign their own PSC agreements with IOC’s. There are suggestions that this was likely an unofficial reward 
to the KRG after they gave full military and logistical support to the U.S and British forces during the invasions 
(Yacoub, 2015). 
The drafting of Iraq’s new oil and gas law has been a key source of debate among policy makers, specifically with 
respect to the operation and management of the oil industry. An INOC would most likely use production-sharing 
contracts with IOC’s, which were unfavorable due to their notorious exploitation of the Iraqi oil sector in the past 
(Yacoub, 2015). On the other hand, regional control of oil operations (and subsequent revenue) would create a 
measure of inequality between regions with vast oil producing capacity and those without, potentially leading to 
large internal migration to areas which generate the most revenue, under the assumption of a better provision of 
services and economic prosperity. Ultimately it would be settled that the distribution and sharing of revenue shall 
be determined annually through the country’s State Budget Law (SBL) and thus subject to annual adjustments and 
approval by the parliament. Furthermore, oil revenues are not distributed remotely but are combined with other 
revenues in the budget. No other statutory system for oil revenue sharing exists, however the KRG collects payments 
from the PSC’s it enters into with IOC’s (Aresti, 2016).  
Oil production in Iraq has grown steadily since 2004 from just over 2MMBD to 4,2MMBD by 2016 (see Figure 4 
below), effectively more than doubling of its average daily output. The sharp rise in production can be attributed to 
a host of factors, most notably the easing of UN trade sanctions and the restoration of damaged oil infrastructure. 




FIGURE 4: IRAQ OIL PRODUCTION & EXPORTS, 2004 - 2016 
 
Sources: International Monetary Fund, OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2016 
oilfields in Iraq and profited from them by means of oil smuggling and black-market trading (Wahab, 2015). There 
was a noticeable rise in production (& exports) between 2014 & 2016. The average production growth between 
2004 & 2014 was 4.57%; while production growth between from 2014 –2015 & 2015-2016 was 12.41% and 20.57% 
FIGURE 5: IRAQ OIL RENTS AS % OF GDP & ANNUAL AVERAGE DOMESTIC CRUDE OIL PRICES 
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respectively. This was a deliberate move on the part of Iraq and was justified on the grounds of the government 
needing to raise funds to initiate the offensive against ISIS. In December 2016, OPEC announced an agreement to 
collectively cut global oil production by 1,2MMBD, due to of the global over-supply and resulting decline in the crude 
oil price (The Economist, 2016). Iraq had committed to the agreement but has largely failed to comply with its 
provisions, citing the need for funds to continue the offensive against ISIS.  
In addition to the over-supply, factors such as the firming of the US Dollar, slower than expected demand growth 
and the Iranian nuclear deal had all contributed to the decline in the global oil price. For Iraq, the declining oil price 
had consequently resulted in a decline in oil rents as a percentage of GDP from 41.2% in 2014 to 28.6% in 2015 (see 
Figure 5 above). The drop in the oil price could likely also explain Iraq’s sharp increase in its production level after 
2014. While OPEC has thus far been lenient with respect to Iraq violating the agreement on OPEC member 
production cuts, it is likely to increase pressure as it continues to push for a recovery in the price of crude oil.  
However, there is optimism over a medium-to-long-run recovery, particularly if both OPEC and non-OPEC producers 
can agree to cut production and more importantly, stringently comply with these cuts (Melton, 2017).  
2.4 PATRONAGE NETWORKS AND CORRUPTION IN IRAQ UNDER THE BA’ATH REGIME 
If Iraq were to be characterized by two elements, one would be its vast oil wealth; the other would be the high levels 
of corruption.  Corruption has been an omnipresent feature in Iraq, both pre-and-post the Saddam Hussain & Ba’ath 
party era. As a consequence of their diversity, corrupt practices are extremely difficult, if not impossible to measure 
(USIP, 2010). Corruption in Iraq has in many ways been a product of the patrimonial practices and neo-patrimonial 
governance models that have been practiced since the inception of the modern Iraqi state, as a mechanism to 
consolidate power (Mahdy, 2016). Politics in Iraq has evolved and become more concerned with political survival 
and significantly less about effective leadership and good governance. Under the Saddam Hussain regime and the 
leadership that has followed, governance relied primarily on patronage networks as a mechanism to co-opt and 
maintain loyalty and support, all of which have contributed significantly to the high level of corruption in the country.  
2.4.1 RESOURCE EXPLOITATION FOR REGIME CONSOLIDATION 
Nationalizing the oil industry undoubtedly served in the best interests of Iraq, however it also facilitated monopolistic 
access to large oil revenues for the regime. This served as a powerful tool for the consolidation of power by co-opting 
society through various public goods and social services, as well as coercing opposition into submission by means of 
a well-supplied security apparatus (Wahab, 2015). The policies of the regime during its infancy followed the trend 
of most newly-established autocratic governments i.e. a very socialistic approach, almost exclusively intended to 
win the hearts and minds of the population. It was an easier task considering the relative neglect of the population 
under previous governments. It is important to note that by being less transparent, oil revenue-funded governments 




public are never privy to information relating to the spending-to-revenue ratio and remain under the guise that the 
government are allocating all funds efficiently (Ross, 2012). The nature of these policies was evident by the 
subsidizing of several goods and services in the economy, such as food, fuel and healthcare. In addition, the public 
sector also offered lucrative employment opportunities which attracted top college graduates in the country.   
Measures on transparency and the quality of governance under the Ba’ath regime are understandably scarce. 
General perceptions of corruption were low during the Ba’ath regimes infancy, largely attributed to the 
government’s consistent involvement in construction and infrastructure projects that provided employment and 
increased living standards (Al-Ali, 2014). This is not to say that corruption itself was low, rather it was more delicate, 
protected by networks of patronage and often affected through state institutions, at least up until the imposition of 
sanctions. An example of this was the formation of a parasite-like semiprivate sector, comprising primarily of 
contractors, entrepreneurs, and other intermediaries. This conglomerate benefited largely from government 
revenue by acquiring exclusive access to economic opportunities, particularly high-value government contracts.  
Unsurprisingly, many of these individuals had family ties or hailed from the same tribal ancestry as leading Ba’athist 
figures or other state officials (Marr, 2003). This was in line with the common theme of religious, ethnic and tribal 
principles under which the Ba’ath party structured itself and its networks of patronage.  
Measures of transparency and the quality of governance under the Ba’ath regime became available late in the 
1990’s. Between 1996 & 2003, Worldwide Governance Indicators show consistent poor performance across all six  
TABLE 3: IRAQ WORLDWIDE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS FOR SELECTED YEARS BETWEEN 1996 
& 2003 
Year Voice & 
Accountability 
Political Stability 







Rule of Law Control of 
Corruption 
1996 -1.957 -1.850 -1.947 -2.022 -1.512 -1.534 
1998 -1.923 -1.594 -1.865 -2.165 -1.485 -1.250 
2000 -1.993 -1.771 -1.865 -2.153 -1.330 -1.470 
2002 -2.040 -1.648 -1.876 -1.994 -1.470 -1.295 
2003 -1.464 -2.426 -1.660 -1.430 -1.665 -1.217 
Source: Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010 
* The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) is a research dataset summarizing the views on the quality of governance provided 
by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries. The scale ranges 
from -2.5 to 2.5, where higher values correspond to better governance outcomes and lower values correspond to poor 
governance outcomes  
categories of governance. Corruption at a state level intensified and became more flagrant after the imposition of 




the regimes public expenditures and weakening state’s law enforcement and service institutions. They also 
unintentionally increased civil society’s dependence on the regime, particularly after a rationing system had been 
put in place to manage food shortages. The impact of the sanctions was evident through hyperinflation, currency 
devaluation and rising unemployment (Alnasrawi 2001). In addition to this, GDP per capita declined to a mere US 
$343 by 1996, having previously peaked at US $4,219 in 1979 (Sassoon 2012). Outside of the Oil-for-Food Program, 
the regime developed an intricate and illicit oil smuggling network, which exported large amounts of Iraqi crude oil, 
with the revenues channeled directly to Saddam Hussain, senior party figures and key regime proponents (Volcker, 
Goldstone, and Pieth 2005). Given that the sanctions had brought with it the risk of revolt against the regime, 
Saddam Hussein leveraged the influence and authority of tribal leaders by granting them greater autonomy to 
generate revenues in return for nullifying any dissidents and advocating continued regime support (Wahab, 2015). 
These mechanisms ensured that with corruption becoming more apparent, the regime would not need to be 
concerned about any resistance movements. 
2.4.2 REGIME INCENTIVE MECHANISMS: PRACTICES OF CLIENTELISM & NEPOTISM   
Access to state resources is a mechanism through which patronage networks are nurtured.  The Ba’ath regime 
developed elaborate networks of patronage which used incentive schemes to reward support and loyalty to Saddam 
Hussain. These schemes were primarily implemented through practices of clientelism & nepotism.  Many Iraqis 
received medals, certificates and badges from the regime that designated different levels of status and privileges 
(Wahab, 2015). It is important to note that the recipients of these privileges comprised of both party and non-party 
members, with the latter mainly including individuals who had great influence over local societies, such as tribal 
elders and prominent religious leaders.  Among the most desirable of these rewards was the “Identity Card of the 
Friends of Mr. President Leader Saddam Hussein”, which entitled holders to privileges such as extra exam grades for 
the member’s children, special access to housing, acceptance of family members into universities and priority 
services in the government bureaucracy (Wahab, 2015 & Sassoon, 2011; 2012 & 2016). 
Acts of nepotism were also widely used in the incentive schemes. The Bertelsmann Foundation (2012) indicates that 
the public sector often appointed unqualified employees purely based on sectarian, political, tribal and family ties. 
One of the more interesting experiences though of the Ba’ath regime was that loyalty to Saddam Hussain and the 
Ba’ath party seemingly took precedence over ethnic or religious allegiances. This was evident when considering that 
Kurds, Shias, Sunnis, and Christians were all affiliated to the Ba’ath party, held positions in public office and took 
part its security operations & intelligence apparatuses (Wahab, 2015). It was a unique circumstance given that at 
the heart of many internal Iraqi conflicts were the ethno-sectarian divides which have in the past, contributed 
significantly towards political instability. However, it is also illustration that whilst ethnic and religious identities do 




and religious loyalty. Therefore, creating dependencies through patronage proves to be an effective mechanism for 
attracting political support in Iraq. 
Parallel to the incentive mechanisms for attaining support were the multi-layered security agencies and intelligence 
apparatus which were employed to ensure the survival of the regime. Within the intelligence apparatus were also 
intricate networks of informants placed among both supporters and opponents of the regime. These networks 
ensured that any plots to challenge the regime were undercut, and coupled with the security forces, any resistance 
or potential uprising would be nullified (Otterman, 2003). These institutions became particularly important to the 
regime after the effects of the U.N sanctions and wars with Iraq & Kuwait had created resentment by large sections 
of civil society towards the regime. Furthermore, the financial implications of the sanctions also meant that the 
regime was not able to maintain the welfare state-like approach under which it had initially gained popularity and 
public approval (Wahab, 2015).  Creating these institutions were very much a product of the lessons learnt from the 
numerous coups that occurred in Iraq in the 1960s and 1970s (Sassoon 2011). The creation of oppressive security 
institutions and extensive patronage networks, funded by Iraq’s vast oil wealth, illustrated the extent to which the 
Ba’ath regime, and Saddam Hussain in particular had gone in the pursuit of absolute power and self-enrichment, all 
at the expense of the Iraqi population. 
2.5 IRAQI LEADERSHIP AFTER 2003: A LINGERING LEGACY OF PATRONAGE AND CORRUPTION 
The democratic transition in Iraq has for the better part been chaotic and dysfunctional. It is somewhat 
understandable considering that newly formed democracies often do not have the same stability as long-standing 
authoritarian regimes, particularly when there are continuous power struggles. Libya, Egypt and Tunisia post the 
2011 Arab Spring are prime examples. For Iraq however, despite being more than 10 years on from the democratic 
transition, the government is still plagued by high levels of corruption and practices of patronage. The only 
transformation has been the manner in which these activities are practiced. For example, the structure of patronage 
has evolved from being affected through a national hierarchical structure to now local decentralized networks 
(Wahab, 2015). Similarly, corruption has primarily been concerned with the plundering of public resources for self 
and political party-enrichment. The persistence of these activities within the public sector are widely regarded as a 
legacy of the Saddam Hussain regime, and without an effective means to curb it is likely to continue to be a feature 
in the Iraqi economy (Ghanim, 2011). 
Not only have corruption and patronage practices been ubiquitous since 2003, they have intensified, become more 
apparent and increased in the number of actors. The advent of democracy has brought with it an increase in political 
freedom and representation in Iraq, but at the same time has made corruption competitive as rival political factions 
compete for access to government offices and wealth, thereby being able to distribute wealth and employment in 
public offices to co-opt support and marginalize political rivals (Wahab, 2015). Indeed, the practice of patronage as 




democratic values and economic & social capital development. Corruption is still affected through legal streams such 
as inefficient employment and unmerited contracting. For example, in 2014 government payrolls were found to 
include approximately fifty-thousand “ghost employees,” even “ghost battalions” of soldiers who either did not exist 
or do not report to work, however their paychecks were still collected (Cockburn 2014; al-Salhy, 2014). These legal 
mechanisms of corruption are however comparatively rare in respect of the various illegal mechanisms. Massive 
embezzlement, procurement scams, money laundering, oil smuggling and widespread bureaucratic bribery are now 
the dominant forms of corruption in Iraq and have led the country to the bottom of international corruption rankings 
(Agator, 2013). These elements have characterized politics in Iraq after 2003 and illustrated that political survival 
has become primarily about maintaining patronage linkages rather than effective state building and service delivery.  
Systematic corruption in Iraq is also a product of feeble and inefficient mechanisms to reduce it. Indeed after 2003, 
several integrity bodies were established and given the mandate to reduce the extent of corruption at a state level.  
These institutions have thus far been ineffective, largely due to them being (intentionally) under-resourced and 
politicized, with the prime-minister himself often intervening in on-going corruption investigations to protect cabinet  
FIGURE 6: IRAQ WORLDWIDE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS, 2004 - 2015 
 
Source: Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010, Updated for 2015 
* The estimate for Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism were greater than -2.5 between 2004 & 2008 due to the 
impact of the 2003 US invasion & the years of sectarian violence which followed 
ministers and senior officials (Wahab, 2015). This is not the only mechanism through which the leadership have 
failed to eradicate corruption within its governance structures. Indeed, senior political figures such as former Prime 
Minister Nouri Al-Maliki, who served between 2006 & 2014, consolidated support by building networks of patronage 
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government positions (Wahab, 2015). The analysis of governance indicators suggests that, excluding that of political 
stability, Iraqi governance has improved since 2003 (See figure 6). However, considering that Iraq is more than 10 
years on from the political transition, the performance on these indicators is still very poor.  
The prevalence of corruption in Iraq may also be a significant contributor to the enduring political instability, 
sectarian violence and insurgent activity. Several studies support the notion that corruption does have a strong link 
to the likelihood of terrorist/extremist/insurgent activity, particularly in developing countries (Atwood, 2003; 
Chayes, 2016; Shelly, 2004; USIP, 2010; Zumve et al., 2013). Although high levels of corruption are not the only 
contributing factor towards the destabilization of a country, it can play a significant role in undermining the public 
confidence in institutions, which can become a driver of conflict. The links between governance, corruption, and 
conflict are complex and interrelated, and a reality in many countries (USIP, 2010). Figure 7 below provides measures  
FIGURE 7: IRAQ CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX & IRAQ TERRORISM INDEX 2003 - 2015 
 
Source: Transparency International and Institute for Economics & Peace 
* The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) ranks countries by their perceived levels of corruption, as determined by expert 
assessments and opinion surveys. The CPI currently ranks 175 countries on a scale from 100 (very clean) to 0 (highly corrupt). 
* The Global Terrorism Index (GTI) is based on data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and is a comprehensive measure 
of the direct and indirect impact of terrorism in 163 countries in terms of lives lost, injuries, property damage and the 
physiological after effects of terrorism. The GTI ranges from 0 (no impact of terrorism) to 10 (highest impact of terrorism). 
for corruption and the impact of terrorist activities between 2003 & 2015. A run of the Spearman’s Correlation (𝑟𝑠) 
finds a relatively strong negative relationship between these values (𝑟𝑠  = - 0.747) i.e. as the CPI score decreases, the 
GTI increases. Indeed, in Iraq conflict and insurrection have spawned from a multitude of factors, including ethno-
sectarian, religious and tribal. However, the impact of corruption at a state level has indeed contributed significantly 
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The distribution of wealth in an economy is a concept which has weighed in significantly to discussions around 
economic policy, most notably in resource-rich countries. One such policy that addresses welfare in an economy is 
the direct distribution of resource revenues. Direct distribution is broadly concerned with the allocation of resource 
revenues, usually in the form of a universal, unconditional cash transfer to the entire population. Direct distribution 
is born out of the notion that resource-rich economies, particularly those with poor institutional quality often 
struggle to harness the true potential of their resource endowments and are ultimately led down a path of corruption 
and pillaging of natural resources for self-enrichment. Direct distribution has been advocated to varying degrees by 
Palley (2003), Birdsall Subramanian (2004), Gillies (2010), Moss (2011), Devarajan et al. (2011), Devarajan and 
Giugale (2012) and McGuirk, Rajaram & Giugale (2016), to name a few. It is important for resource rich countries 
such as Iraq to start considering innovative strategies to address the pitfalls of natural resources and ensure 
sustained poverty reduction and robust economic growth. This chapter will begin with a review of past literature on 
direct distribution, both conceptually as well as specifically in the case of Iraq. It will then proceed to define and 
discuss the various methods for resource wealth management which exist. It will then provide some theoretical 
considerations for direct distribution before closing off with a detailed look at cases of success and failure, where 
direct distribution has been implemented.  
3.1 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The paper by McGuirk, Rajaram & Giugale (2016) is one of the more recent literature works which discusses the 
concept of direct distribution in resource-rich countries. Most past literature works have studied direct distribution 
from a normative perspective relating specifically to the potential economic and political implications, however few 
have studied how direct distribution may emerge as a politically rational choice.  This policy research paper provides 
a theoretical model relating to the decision-making process of political leaders to allocate resource revenues 
optimally between direct cash transfers, expenditure on public goods, power-preserving activities, and personal 
consumption. The paper finds that that the conditions under which an increased share of resource revenues is spent 
on citizen welfare include mainly favorable political climates, strict budgetary accountability and undeveloped 
patronage networks. More relevant to the current study, the paper illustrates that in countries with a high poverty 
headcount coupled with inefficient public institutions, governments may support the political incentive to provide 
direct dividend transfers relative to expenditure on public goods.  
The paper by Moss (2011) proposes the use of direct distribution (cash transfers) as a mechanism for mitigating the 
effects of the natural resource curse. The proposal comes amid suggestions that fragile states with a wealth of 
natural resources are often faced with critical policy questions with respect to the management and spending of 
resource revenue in a manner that is valuable to the economy. The paper supports the natural resource curse theory 




poverty, corruption, authoritarianism and internal conflict is often higher in resource-rich countries in comparison 
to resource-poor countries. The paper supports a policy of cash transfers by suggesting that they create incentives 
for taxation and subsequently greater scrutiny and accountability over public spending. They are also likely to have 
an immediate and significant impact on the welfare of poor households, and finally, they can contribute substantially 
to reducing inequality, particularly if they are executed through a targeted scheme. The paper closes by listing 
selected risks of implementing the policy as well as the subsequent approaches to mitigate those risks. 
Gillies (2010) studied the notion of resource revenue distribution in the context of resource-rich states, with a focus 
on political feasibility and implications of implementing a system of resource revenue distribution. The paper 
explains that the political autonomy of the leadership as well as the sustainability of the resource are the most 
important elements when discussing feasibility.  On the side of implications, it is suggested that direct distribution 
will yield improved levels of governance. The sentiment is shared by Palley (2003) who explains that the reputed 
benefit of a revenue sharing system is that it provides citizens with a vested interest in the natural resources of a 
country, thereby creating incentives for greater political involvement to ensure good governance and 
administration. Gillies (2010) concludes by suggesting that no generic method exists for determining whether 
distribution is a suitable policy option, rather each influencing element must be evaluated on its individual merits 
and how well it fits into the desired outcome. 
Serving as a mechanism to enhance public expenditure in oil-rich economies, Devarajan et al. (2011) proposes that 
a measure of oil revenues be transferred directly to citizens, with a portion thereof taxed to finance public 
expenditures. The concept is based on the notion that public expenditure is financed by taxation as opposed to 
resource revenues accruing directly to the government. The paper also suggests that this approach is likely to 
increase efficiency due to increased civil scrutiny over the spending of natural resource revenues. The paper first 
highlights a tendency for public expenditures in oil-rich economies to be less efficient in comparison to those in other 
developing and frontier markets. A theoretical model is then used to explain why greater transparency and 
accountability over public expenditures can be facilitated by distributing oil revenues directly to citizens and then 
taxing them. The paper concludes by applying this theoretical model and illustrating empirically that enhanced civil 
scrutiny over public expenditure is correlated with better efficiency in government spending, while accountability is 
stronger in countries with a greater dependency on taxation to finance public spending. McGuirk (2013) supports 
this conclusion by illustrating empirically that when leaders are in receipt of large, external rents, the burden of 
taxation can be alleviated from citizens, who will then demand less accountability, eventually resulting in 
dysfunctional political behavior.  
West (2011) specifically discusses the case of Iraq and proposes an oil-based dividend as a mechanism to mitigate 
the risks associated with Petro-States. The paper first discusses the effects of the dividend in the context of the 




highlights that the oil dividend can also contribute towards considerable growth in what has been a rather stagnant 
private sector in Iraq. Another key factor discussed relates to the political impacts of the dividend in Iraq. The paper 
suggests that the political economy In Iraq would react positively in response to the dividend, with the relationship 
between the state and the citizens being strengthened. This is particularly significant in post-conflict situations. The 
paper highlights the mechanics of the dividend as a challenge, specifically with respect to its administration and 
governance. Iraq has pre-existing conditions, such as a competitive mobile phone market which could facilitate 
implementation of the dividend by making available options such mobile phoned-based transfer systems. The paper 
concludes that while there are difficulties for implementing an oil-based dividend policy in Iraq, the positive 
economic and political impacts suggest that the benefits outweigh the risks. The paper is however limited in 
supporting the assertions related to the potential economic impacts given the absence of an empirical analysis. This 
would therefore endorse the need for an empirical analysis, one of which will be conducted in this dissertation. 
With a specific focus on Africa, Devarajan et al. (2013) builds on from the work of Devarajan et al. (2011) and makes 
the case for having a policy of direct transfer of resource revenues in selected resource-rich African economies. The 
proposal of this policy is conceived on the notion that Africa’s resource-rich countries have failed to harness the 
potential of their resource wealth to attain sustained economic growth and poverty reduction, rather it has fueled 
civil conflict and political instability. The paper applies a theoretical model to considerations that a policy of direct 
distribution can facilitate a reduction in poverty as well as an increase social welfare, as countries increase both 
private consumption and the provision of public goods. The paper proposes three key considerations for 
implementing direct distribution of resource revenues. The first being the macroeconomic impact, where increased 
private consumption can potentially create short-term external imbalances. The second is that while there may be 
an argument for privatization of natural resources, direct distribution provides citizens with an individual stake in 
national resources without distorting market incentives for their exploration and exploitation. Lastly, even in the 
most institutionally advanced African economies, administering a policy of direct distribution will be costly and likely 
to require time to implement.  
With a specific focus on Iraq, Palley (2003) also links good governance with the implementation of revenue sharing 
policies. The paper explains that Oil Revenue Distribution Funds (ORDF’s) that directly distribute funds to its citizens, 
act as a means to addressing the natural resource curse. Paley (2003) explains that distributing funds to citizens 
allows them to lead economic growth by means of consumption spending and stimulating domestic demand in other 
sectors of the economy. The paper also explains that, specifically in the case of Iraq with a reputation for inherent 
political instability, the distribution of oil revenue to its citizens provides a means for policy transformation towards 
prioritising social welfare. Palley (2003) also explains that with an economy which is highly dependent on one sector 
of the economy, the probability of high unemployment is excessively high. This is evident in the case of oil dependent 
countries where the oil sector itself is an employer of more semi-to-highly-skilled labour. Consequently, low-to-




the economy and are likely to endure sustained periods of unemployment. The allocation of resource revenues to 
citizens through cash transfers thus provides an income safety net to the population, as well as being an economic 
stimulator through the consumption linkages. 
3.2 RESOURCE WEALTH MANAGEMENT 
Resource-rich countries face significant challenges in translating resource wealth into sustained economic and social 
benefit. A trend common among emerging and developing economies is that resource wealth is often squandered 
through weak institutions and falls prey to corruption, rent-seeking and patronage funding (Dixon & Monk, 2011). 
In addition to this, there is a tendency for countries without other well-developed sectors to overly rely on resource 
wealth, thereby creating an unhealthy dependence on resources, which are often finite and prone to fluctuations. 
The former is of concern to policy makers when considering the notion of inter-generational equity, which is ensuring 
that future generations benefit from present exploits of natural resources. An increasingly popular mechanism 
proposed for mitigating the risks and maximizing the benefit of natural resource wealth is the use of Resource Wealth 
Management Funds or Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWF). SWF’s can take the form of Stabilization or Intergenerational 
(Saving) funds. Understanding the mechanics of these funds provides insight into how countries can better manage 
their natural resource wealth.  
3.2.1 STABILIZATION FUNDS 
Stabilization funds are designed to shelter an economy from the negative effects of resource price fluctuations on 
government revenue. Stabilization funds provide a measure of fiscal discipline to governments through pre-
determined accumulation and withdrawal regulations, both of which are contingent on the price or revenue level of 
the natural resource (Dixon & Monk, 2011). The excess revenue is saved into the stabilization fund when prices or 
revenues exceed the pre-determined threshold. Similarly, the government can access the accumulated funds in 
cases where revenues or prices fall below the pre-determined threshold level. Stabilization funds are generally risk 
averse and can also be accessed relatively quickly, given that they hold a range of liquid, short-term assets. A major 
challenge for stabilization funds is the setting of a pre-determined threshold level. These are generally arbitrarily set 
or calculated based on historical natural resource prices or revenues (Looney, 2006). However, prices for certain 
resources (such as oil) are highly speculative, given the volatility in the market as well as historical trends not being 
valuable predictors of future prices.  
3.2.2 INTERGENERATIONAL FUNDS 
Intergenerational or Saving funds are created for the purposes of safeguarding current wealth for the benefit of 
present and future generations. These funds generally hold a globally diversified portfolio which offsets some of the 
country’s exposure to resource price volatility, such as in the market for oil (Looney, 2006). Intergenerational/Saving 




of fixed-income assets. These funds invest offshore to diversify risk, take demand out of the economy, and limit the 
appreciation of the real exchange rate. Withdrawal rules for the Intergenerational/Saving funds generally dictate 
that a specified portion of the smoothed value of the fund be transferred to the government budget every year 
(Dixon & Monk, 2011). Intergenerational/Saving funds can also develop from Stabilization funds, precisely in cases 
where the latter consistently accumulates revenues over a long period of time. In this case, the country may opt to 
set up a Saving Fund for these excess reserves for the purposes of meeting intergenerational equity goals and 
supporting resourced financed consumption without fueling inflation.  
3.2.3 DIRECT DISTRIBUTION FUNDS 
In addition to Stabilization and Intergenerational funds, there are also Direct Distribution funds. Direct Distribution 
funds are different from other funds in that they are generally not stand-alone accounts (but can be), but rather 
extensions of Intergenerational funds, which transfer a portion of accumulated income directly to citizens in the 
form of an annual dividends. Few countries have experimented with Direct Distribution funds and fewer yet have 
succeeded, with the state of Alaska being the only current working example. There is no doubt that there are many 
resource-rich developing economies who have the capacity to distribute resource wealth to their citizens. However, 
these very countries often lack the institutional capacity and quality to effective administer and govern these 
mechanisms. One reason explaining the success of the Alaskan distribution fund is that it is supported by strong 
institutions with a high level of good governance (Looney, 2006). In addition to this, the success of these funds is 
also dependent on the political arrangements of the state. Strict legislative oversight is required to ensure that 
policymakers respect the integrity of fund laws, specifically with respect to withdrawal rules. Indeed, strong political 
constituency committed to the success of the fund (and the policy as a whole) can realize its benefits. 
3.3 DIRECT DISTRIBUTION: THEORETICAL CONSIDERATION 
There are various expenditure-related difficulties faced by governments in countries with a plethora of natural 
resources, most notably so is the decision around the optimal allocation of revenues derived from these natural 
resources. When considering a policy of direct distribution, a focal point would be to evaluate the inevitable trade-
off to expenditure on public goods. Gillies (2010) explains that naturally, countries could use natural resource 
revenues towards spending on public goods such as educational and transport infrastructure or improving the 
efficiency of public health and security by increasing the number of human resources available to these areas. 
However, resource-rich economies often fare poorly in this regard. Reinikka & Svensson (2004) find that in   
institutionally weak states, expenditure on public investments are prone to leakage, with public funds either 
misallocated or lost through practices of patronage and corruption. Therefore, there is a need to evaluate the use 




The notion of institutional quality is a key component when assessing the optimal spending portfolio. McGuirk, 
Rajaram & Giugale (2016) suggest that countries with weak institutions often lack the technical efficiencies to 
allocate funds to high-return investments, as well not being able to implement them effectively. This sentiment is 
also shared earlier by Collier et al. (2009). Moss (2011) and Devarajan & Giugale (2012) highlight the inequality of 
public spending by suggesting the existence of an inherent bias towards greater allocation for urban areas, or those 
which guarantee electoral support for ruling parties (also where there are networks of patronage). Direct transfers 
benefit citizens at all levels and provide a layer of security against income volatility and acute deprivation in the 
event of economic shocks. Furthermore, evidence from Fernald et al. (2008), Baird et al. (2011), Blattman et al. 
(2013) and Haushofer & Shapiro (2013) suggests that in cases where private citizens were recipients of cash 
transfers, investments were made into socio-economic and developmental enhancing factors such food security, 
healthcare, educational attainment and asset ownership, to name a few. It may therefore be optimal to apportion 
both the distribution of capital and the execution of investments to private citizens. It is important to note that the 
model below evaluates the optimal allocation of resource revenues as a mechanism to generate electoral support 
(thereby contributing towards obtaining political stability), which is particularly relevant in the context of the current 
political discourse in Iraq.  
McGuirk, Rajaram & Giugale (2016) provide a theoretical model for the optimal allocation of resource revenues in a 
case where government seeks to generate electoral support. In addition to direct dividend transfers D, government 
also has the option of generating electoral support by spending a share of revenues 𝐺 on public investments, such 
as public infrastructure, social services and human capital development. The challenge facing the government is to 
identify the bundle (D, G) that maximizes the median voter’s utility. To find this, leaders must consider the utility 
function of the median voter. It is important to note that Um = ?̃? is a representation that citizen utility is linear in 
private consumption, where 𝑐̃ is a function of direct transfers. Extending this interpretation to a standard quasi-
linear function with diminishing marginal returns from private consumption c, and constant returns to public goods 
g, Um = ln 𝑐 + g, where g =⋌ 𝐺, eventually arrive to a point where the marginal allocation to 𝐺 is worth more to the 
median voter, and thus to the government, than the marginal allocation to D. 
An example of this can be illustrated by figure 8 below. We first consider the representations below: 
• ℎ𝐺 = the relationship between public expenditure 𝐺 and citizen utility Um, (⋌ = h)  
• Concave f(D) = represents the relationship between direct transfer D and Um.  
• line f’(D) = plots the slope of f(D) 
Up until the point a, the returns to direct transfers D are higher than the returns to public investment 𝐺, i.e. f’(D) > 
h. However, beyond the point a, the government will optimally allocate to G. The conclusion from this scenario 
indicates that where the initial level private consumption is lower, the returns to direct dividend transfers are higher, 








  Source: McGuirk, Rajaram & Giugale (2016)  
McGuirk, Rajaram & Giugale (2016) also illustrate a case where a country may have “leaky” public institutions, this 
is where the technology ⋌ that converts public outlays 𝐺 to public goods g is less efficient, i.e. ⋌  = l. In this scenario, 
the government will optimally allocate revenues to direct transfers further beyond point a to point b; only thereafter 
will there be an investment into public goods. It is important to note that the concept of inefficient or “leaky” public 
institutions is particularly relevant to the current context of the study.  
In closing, all other factors remaining constant, the model indicates that with respect to countries that experience a 
higher poverty headcount or with greater inefficiency within its public institutions, government will optimally 
allocate more resource revenues to direct dividend transfers and less towards its expenditure on public goods. 
3.4 EXPERIMENTS WITH DIRECT DISTRIBUTION: REVIEW OF PAST EXPERIENCES 
Before countries make the decision to adopt new policies, extensive research is often done into the impacts they 
have had in other regions. In the case of direct distribution however, it is difficult to advocate for the policy based 
on the evidence of past experiences. Globally, few countries have considered the possibilities of direct distribution, 
and even fewer have experimented with them. However, despite the limited exposure of the policy to practical 
application, the past experiences with it do provide valuable insights into its workings and possible impacts. 
Arguably, the most famed of experiments with direct distribution is in the case of the oil-rich state of Alaska, which 
coincidently also happens to have the only existing policy of its nature. Mongolia is another region where a policy of 
direct distribution had been tested. It is an interesting example in that despite it not being within the context of 
hydrocarbon related resources, the circumstances which supported the implementation of the policy are similar to 




in the past also experimented with direct distribution on some level, however not to the extent to which Alaska has. 
This section will study the cases of Alaska and Mongolia with respect to their experiences with direct distribution. 
3.4.1 THE ALASKAN PERMANENT FUND DIVIDEND 
Alaska’s history with oil wealth dates back to early 1969, coinciding with the first oil boom. Since then, oil and other 
hydrocarbon related resources have been essential to the state’s economy, accounting for between 65% and 90% 
of state revenues (McBeath et al., 2008). The industry has also seen its fair share of controversy with the 1989 Exxon 
Valdez spill and more recently, the disputes related to fracking in the pristine Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. 
Notwithstanding these elements, downscaling activities in the oil industry would come at a huge cost. The oil 
industry exerts substantial influence over the economy, not only with respect to generating much of state revenues 
but also its contribution to employment opportunities. It is estimated that every 1 in 3 Alaskan jobs are either directly 
or indirectly (through labour funded by oil revenues) dependent on the oil-industry (Goldsmith, 2010). For Alaskan 
citizens, the oil industry also provides an important source of income, distributed through the Alaskan Permanent 
Fund Dividend (APFD). 
Established in 1982, the APFD is a universal, unconditional cash transfer based directly on the level of government 
oil revenues, distributed annually. The AFPD is an extension of the Alaskan Permanent Fund, a SWF created in 1976 
for the purposes of accumulating annual royalties from the sale of state-owned natural resources, with the funds 
subsequently invested in a diversified portfolio of equities and fixed-income assets. The principal of the Fund 
remained fixed, however its earnings could be spent by the state and thus the creation of the Dividend as a wealth 
distribution mechanism from income earned. This dividend is calculated as 52.2% of the fund’s nominal income 
averaged over five years, divided by the number of eligible recipients. The welfare impacts the PFD suggest that it  
FIGURE 9: ALASKAN PERMANENT FUND EVOLUTION 
 
Source: Writers representation, Information from Berman & Reamey (2016) 
has experienced significant success since inception. By 2007, poverty in Alaska was the joint second lowest in the 
United States, despite only having the nineteenth highest per capita income in the country (Segal, 2012).  
Furthermore, the PFD has also been a significant source of income for rural Alaskans. An analysis of the APFD by 












(depending on the precise size of the dividend). Native Alaskans have also benefited tremendously from the PFD, 
having reduced the number of native Alaskans living in poverty by one-quarter. These results suggest that as a 
resource sharing policy, the PFD has contributed substantially to ensuring that the natural resources benefit the 
population, primarily through its impact on poverty and welfare.  
In the context of replicating the Alaskan model in other oil producing regions, there are several factors to consider. 
In perhaps the most obvious ways, Alaska shares very few to almost no similarities to other oil-producing regions in 
the rest the world. Firstly, as part of the United States, Alaska's government is an advanced, representative 
democracy with multiple layers of political constraints & balances and strong institutions, which in turn facilitate 
effective governance and administration of the PFD. Secondly, while the state of Alaska is dependent on oil for the 
local economy, the United States as a country are not. Therefore, for Alaskans to only benefit from the state’s oil 
wealth does not cause conflict with other states, nor does it adversely affect inequality in the rest of the country. 
However, consider a case of Iraq where an entire country is dependent on oil, but has only applied a PFD to its oil 
producing regions. This is likely to generate internal conflict while also creating significant wealth imbalances. Lastly, 
the disparities which exist in population size also play a key role with respect to challenges of governance and 
administration. Theoretically, effective policy design and strong institutions to implement them mean that applying 
a PFD to a larger population size is simply a matter of taking the existing mechanics of the policy to the required 
scale. In practice however, managing larger population sizes is likely to be more costly and time-consuming, 
particularly in administering for rural-based population segments.   
3.4.2 THE MONGOLIAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT FUND  
There have been cases of countries, rich in resources other oil, which have in the past experimented with sovereign 
wealth distribution. On such example is the copper-rich region of Mongolia. In the context of evaluating direct 
distribution in the case of Iraq, the experiences of Mongolia may be more appropriate than those of Alaska for many 
reasons. Firstly, Mongolia is a developing country and arguably the only one that has introduced natural resource-
funded cash transfers. Secondly, much like the case of Iraq, a fragility of allegiances and underperforming institutions 
has resulted in a relatively unstable political environment (Yeung & Howes, 2015). Lastly, as a consequence of the 
struggle to maintain the strength of its institutions, corruption has plagued the government, a pattern that is all too 
familiar in Iraq and other regions.  
Mongolia’s resources-to-cash scheme was experienced through different phases, influenced largely by the 
movement in commodity prices. The policy was first proposed by Mongolia’s opposition Democracy Party during the 
2004 elections, under the banner of the Child Money Program. A key outcome of this was the volume votes received 
in support of the policy, forcing the ruling People’s Revolutionary Party to form a coalition government with the 
Democracy Party.  The CMP commenced in 2006 which handed a monthly transfer of US $2.50 per child to families 




requiring that the recipient children be attending school (for those over the age of 8), be living with their parents 
and be up to date with mandatory vaccinations (Yeung & Howes, 2015). The three-child requirement was dropped 
early after implementation, however other conditional elements continued to be enforced.  
After sustained growth in resource revenues in mid-2006, the CMP was replaced with the Universal Child Money 
Program (UCMP), which entitled all children to a cumulative amount of US $116.19 per year.  Concurrently, Mongolia 
also launched the Mongolian Development Fund (MDF), serving as the country’s first attempt at a sovereign wealth 
fund and a mechanism to legislate the link between government resource receipts and cash transfers (Yeung & 
Howes, 2015). Having witnessed the gain in political support which followed the proposal of the CMP, the 
Democratic Party began lobbying for a policy under which every Mongolian would receive cash-transfers. Continued 
growth in resource revenues supported the Democratic Party proposal and despite criticism and concerns regarding 
affordability, 2010 saw the creation of the Human Development Fund (HDF), an extension of the MDF which 
provided each citizen with an annual cash-transfer of US $89.08 in 2010, rising to US $198.84 from early 2011 to 
mid-2012. 
FIGURE 10: MONGOLIAN DISTRIBUTION FUND EVOLUTION 
 
Source: Writers representation; Information from Yeung & Howes (2015) 
The universal cash transfer through the HDF was eventually discontinued after proving to be largely unaffordable 
and was agreed to not be used by any political party for future election campaigns. The Child Money Program was 
reintroduced in October 2012, having been included in policy plans of both major parties. From 2018 onwards, 
Mongolia plan to establish the Future Heritage Fund (FHF), a conventional sovereign wealth fund focused on saving 
and investing resource revenues, earmarking only from 2030 onwards. 
The outcomes of the various distribution phases suggest a mixture of success and failure of the policy. Yeung & 
Howes (2015) find that direct transfers certainly had clear poverty and equity benefits. The HDF contributed to a 
reduction in nearly a third of poverty, approximately 10% (depending on the year and poverty line used). Similarly, 
inequality in all years was reduced (to varying degrees) due to the HDF. The conditionality attached the CMP and 
Targeted Child Money Program: January 2005 – June 2006
Universal Child Money Program: July 2006 to December 2009
Human Development Fund / Universal Payments: February 2010 
to June 2012
Child Money Program: October 2012 onwards




UCMP also contributed to a reduction in child mortality, improvements in literacy and schooling participation rates. 
Lastly, the distribution policies also contributed to improvements in accountability and the extent of corruption. The 
biggest fallout from these distribution policies was the macroeconomic costs incurred by the state. Design, planning 
and implementation flaws often led the government having to take loans to meet direct transfer payments, 
particularly after the 2008/2009 financial crisis triggered a decline in world copper prices. Between 2010 & 2012, 
Public external debt as a % of GDP rose from 30.8% to 48.3%, with a significant portion of HDF expenditure allocated 
to repaying the interest on these loans (Yeung & Howes, 2015). Shlilegmaa et al. (2013) suggest that the direct 
transfers also contributed significantly to spikes in inflation, citing the increase in inflation between 2009 & 2012 by 
just less than 10 percentage points.  
Other criticisms of the policies focus mainly on design, administration and implementation. Yeung & Howes (2015) 
found that whilst the HDF became a significant, if not primary source of income for poor families, it had very little 
impact on living standards of more affluent population segments. Fritz, Finch and Byambatsogt (2008) suggest that 
this may well be attributed to high inclusion and exclusion rates during the means testing, thereby hindering the 
credibility of the system. Lastly, apart from being lengthy, the administrative process also often excluded some of 
the poorest segments of the population from accessing the transfers, with the time and cost of travelling to 
distribution centers proving to be a major obstacle.  This experience of Mongolia suggests that while there are clear 
benefits to direct transfers, effective planning, design and implementation are essential in ensuring that it is 
inclusive, affordable and sustainable to successfully achieve the desired effects. 
In considering a policy of direct distribution for Iraq, two key questions need to be answered: 
1. What would a policy of direct distribution of resource revenues entail for Iraq? 











The success of direct distribution as a policy relies significantly on the prevailing political environment, as much as it 
does on good planning, design and implementation. In more recent times, Iraqi leaders have shown a greater 
commitment and willingness to pursue a more equitable distribution of income as well as actively seeking to 
eradicate corruption. Indeed, corruption exists as one of the largest impediments to political stability and greater 
economic prosperity, and whilst there is enough evidence to suggest that direct distribution can reduce corruption 
by facilitating improvements in transparency and accountability, it is not feasible to implement a policy purely based 
on these outcomes without assessing whether it makes good economic sense to do so. The analysis presented here 
will therefore evaluate the economic impacts of direct distribution. This chapter will begin with a brief overview of 
the current social security program in Iraq and the past proposals for its reform. It will thereafter begin with the 
empirical analysis, starting with an illustration of the data/model to be used and the accompanying research 
methodology. The chapter will then move forward by stating what the assumptions to the model are. The chapter 
will then proceed to the presentation of the results derived from the simulations in the model, as well as a discussion 
of the results relating to the feasibility of the policy in the case of Iraq. The chapter will conclude with a brief 
discussion of the limitations to the model. 
4.1 DIRECT DISTRBUTION IN THE CURRENT CONTEXT OF IRAQ 
Iraq is no stranger to the concept of distribution, given that it has one of the largest in-kind distribution programs in 
the world, the Public Distribution System (PDS). The PDS is a universal food security program which allows citizens 
to purchase a pre-determined list of government-subsidized food commodities monthly (Krishnan, Olivieri & 
Ramadan, 2017). These commodities include specified portions of wheat flour, rice, sugar, vegetable oil and 
children’s milk. The PDS does indeed play an important role in providing households with the means to obtain 
essential food commodities but has also come under increasing scrutiny. Among the critiques of the PDS is that it is 
the system remains inefficient, costly and in more recent times has been undermined by frequent insurgent activity 
(IMF, 2015). These elements have supported the calls for reform to the current PDS towards more efficient and less 
costly distribution programs such as cash transfers.  
There have been previous attempts by the government to introduce reforms to the current PDS.  In August of 2005, 
the Iraqi government formed a ministerial committee to consider reforming the ration card system (Alzobaidee, 
2015). The discussion centered around abolishing the ration card system in favour of cash transfers. It went a step 
further in 2012 where after a two-year study, the Iraqi cabinet had voted to remove the PDS in favour of direct cash 
transfers from accumulated oil revenues (AFP, 2012). Among the benefits here was that direct cash transfers would 
also be higher in value, given that the government would derive additional savings from some of the administrative 
and logistical burdens that the PDS contained (such as costs of transporting food commodities, running costs at 




rival political factions and outbreaks of internal conflict. The reforms were ultimately set aside with the intention to 
revisit at a later stage. Indeed, while it is complex to conceive subsidy reform in Iraq under the current challenging 
environments, the fiscal pressures from the conflict and the decline in oil prices may again catalyze support for these 
reforms (IMF, 2015).  
The concept of direct transfers in Iraq has also strongly been proposed on the basis of advancing developmental 
outcomes, as well as reducing high levels of corruption. Indeed, several eminent economists and development 
scholars have advocated for a policy of this nature. Birdsall and Subramanian (2004) proposed a 10-year guarantee, 
to be written into the Iraq constitution, of a dividend of at least 50% of oil revenues. Clemons (2003) proposed a 
dividend from an investment fund in the same manner as the US state of Alaska. Palley (2003) argued for a 25% 
dividend direct from oil revenues, without the intermediation of an investment fund. More recently, West (2011) 
proposed a US $220 per capita oil dividend rising with expansions in production. Aside from it having been regularly 
proposed in literature, the distribution of oil revenues was also seriously considered by US authorities after the 
transitioning of power in 2003 but was not actively pursued due to the politics of the time (West, 2011). The closest 
Iraq came to the distribution of oil revenues was in 2012, where the ministry of planning announced a proposal to 
distribute 25% of oil revenue surpluses (US $200 to each citizen) to the population (al-Hassoun, 2012). However, the 
policy was again postponed over uncertainties regarding its implementation.  
Considering the extensive interdependencies which exist in a socioeconomic system, it becomes of paramount 
importance to assess the economy wide implications of this proposed policy. Theory suggests that when large 
enough, citizen-based distribution of resource revenues can have significant intersectoral effects on an economy, 
primarily through the consumptions linkages. In addition to this, it is also expected for there to be a substantial 
impact on the distribution of income, due to the differential effects of the proposed policy across the various 
household groups. Owing to the above, it is therefore a requirement that the model being used to evaluate the 
merits of this policy be able to comprehensively demonstrate its potential economic-wide impacts and the 
subsequent implications thereof.  Indeed, there is evidence to suggest appetite for Iraq to pursue a policy of this 
nature. What remains however is that if actively pursued, what are the expected/potential impacts of this policy on 
the Iraqi economy? 
4.2 DATA & RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This analysis will use a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) to estimate the multiplier effects on households, output and 
GDP from an exogenous cash transfer to households in the Iraqi economy. A SAM is a representation of all economic 
transactions in a socio-economic system, taking place during an accounting cycle, usually for a period of one year 
(Round, 2003). All elements of the economy are illustrated in a single square matrix, where each individual cell is a 
representation of the economic interaction of one element with another (Appendix A1 provides a schematic of a 




the use of SAM’s. Firstly, SAM’s are comprehensive in nature as they give a presentation of all activity in an economic 
system. Secondly, they provide a precise and accurate illustration of the interconnection between the various 
elements in the economy. Lastly, there is a measure of flexibility both in the extent to which a SAM can be 
disaggregated as well as the focus on specific elements in the economy. Multipliers are used to illustrate the 
economy-wide impacts of an exogenous injection.  Breisinger et al. (2009) indicates that multipliers are useful in 
determining the level to which a direct effect is amplified by indirect linkage effects. This enables identifying not only 
what the direct impact of a shock could be, and also the indirect benefits/detriments which may accrue.  
SAM’s have been influential in studying how various counterfactuals impact the economy with respect to total 
production, the interaction of different sectors and production factors and the distribution of income among its 
institutions (Debowicz, 2016). At the heart of the SAM framework is the position of households in the economy. 
Round (2003) goes as far as to suggest that an accounting matrix can only be described as “social” if it has 
incorporated a measure of detail relating to the distribution of income to and from households. Past studies by 
Davies (2007) and Staunton (2011) have used SAM’s to assess the impact on the economy and households from an 
injection of income into one part of the economy. In this instance, Davies (2007) suggests that the impact of an 
income injection in the economy is contingent on its circulation in the economy. For example, if a portion of the 
income is used to consume locally produced goods and services, this has an impact of stimulating domestic demand 
as well as contributing to aggregate output in the economy. SAM’s have thus proven to be particularly useful when 
seeking to assess the economy-wide impact of income injections. 
With respect to the nature of the policy being tested, there are a few elements which support the use of a SAM 
model. Firstly, a consistent data base of the Iraqi economy is required to effectively capture the economy wide 
effects of the shock, which is difficult given the dearth of reliable data for Iraq. The SAM thus provides an integrated 
and consistent database providing a representation of the economy, including information on household income 
and expenditure patterns.  Secondly, given that the analysis intends to model the effects of direct cash transfers at 
specific household groups, the SAM provides a comprehensive data framework which allows for the representation 
of the differential direct effects which the transfer would have on the different household groups. Thirdly, the policy 
shock leads to a substantial allocation of income to households. The expenditure of this income can be expected to 
have economy wide effects through the demand stimulus. The SAM provides a model that can illustrate the demand 
stimulus effect, as well as capture the inter-industry effects of the shock.  
The SAM used for this analysis will be an existing dataset on Iraq for the year 2011, produced by Debowicz (2013). 
Table 4 (which follows) provides an illustration of the 2011 aggregated SAM for Iraq. The construction of the SAM 
made use of a variety of data sources including 2013 Iraqi IMF reports and the Iraq Household Socio-Economic Survey 







TABLE 4: 2011 AGGREGATED SOCIAL ACCOUNTING MATRIX (TRILLIONS OF CURRENT IRAQI DINARS) 


















Activities   422.20                     422.20 
Commodities 232.24       89.74 22.56         38.05 96.53 479.12 
Labour 67.71                       67.71 
Capital and 
Land 
143.59                       143.59 
Households     67.71 66.38   9.66           0.12 143.86 
Government       76.79     -21.34 -6.81 3.23 6.80     58.67 
Activity Tax -21.34                       -21.34 
Sales Tax   -6.81                     -6.81 
Import Tax   3.23                     3.23 
Direct Tax         6.80               6.80 
Savings-
Investment 
        47.32 21.43           -30.70 38.05 
Rest of the 
World 
  60.50   0.42   5.02             65.95 
Total 422.20 479.12 67.71 143.59 143.86 58.67 -21.34 -6.81 3.23 6.80 38.05 65.95   






4.2.1 MODEL FRAMEWORK 
The circular income flow model is applied to evaluate the direct, indirect and induced flow of expenditure for the 
proposed policy, as illustrated by figure 11 below. The circular flow of income exists as an economy-wide model 
capturing various inter-industry transactions including, the generation of income through producing activities, the 
payment of income to factors of production, the distribution of factor and non-factor incomes to households and 
the expenditure by households on commodities (Round, 2004). These relationships/movements of income between 
various accounts are illustrated within the basic structure of SAM models. In the model below, the direct effects are 
the changes in the economy resulting from the direct income transfer to households. The extent of the direct effect 
is illustrated by the purple dotted area in the figure below. The indirect effect, which are products of the direct 
effects are related to the inter-industry transactions caused by the initial direct shock to the economy.  
FIGURE 11: CIRCULAR FLOW OF INCOME IN THE MULTIPLIER PROCESS 
 
Source: Authors own representation  
As shown in the model, the impact of an increase in household disposable income is an increase in the 
expenditure/consumption of goods and services by households. This demand stimulus would in-turn require an 
increase in the supply of goods and services available, which require increases in inputs for increased production of 
goods and services. The indirect effects are illustrated by the green dotted area in the figure above. Lastly, the 
induced effects represent the changes in household expenditure due to the additional income generated by the 
changes (increases) in the production. As more factors of production are employed (one of these being labour) to 
meet the increased demand for goods & services, additional income therefore accrues to households (labour). The 
induced effects are illustrated by the blue dotted area in the figure above. These multiplier effects of transferred 
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4.2.2 MATHEMATICAL SAM MODEL 
Table 5 illustrates the basic structure of the SAM. The production activities represent inter-industry transactions, as 
well as the industrial output and sale of intermediate and final products. The production factors are a representation 
of labour and capital factor transactions. Institutions are a representation of economic activities of households, 
corporations and government, with households usually disseminated into groups or quantiles based on income 
levels. Other accounts are a representation of taxes/subsidies, investment and the external sector (rest of the world). 
T1,1 is a representation of the intermediate demand of goods and services, while the final demand of goods and 
services by institutions are represented by T1,3. When no economic transactions occur between corresponding 
accounts, cells are given a zero value (T1,2; T2,2; T2,3 & T3,1). Generally, production activities, factors and institutions 
(excluding government) are endogenous accounts, whilst all other accounts are considered exogenous.  
Mathematically, income distributions of endogenous accounts are illustrated below: 
Production Activities →  𝒀𝟏 =  𝑻𝟏,𝟏 +  𝑻𝟏,𝟑 + 𝑿𝟏  
 
Production Factors →  𝒀𝟐 =  𝑻𝟐,𝟏 + 𝑿𝟐  
 
Institutions →  𝒀𝟑 =  𝑻𝟑,𝟐 +  𝑻𝟑,𝟑 + 𝑿𝟑  
The coefficient matrix 𝐶 is obtained where each relevant 𝑇 column is divided by each relevant 𝑌 



























In linear form, the SAM framework can be expressed as below: 
𝒀 = 𝑪𝒀 + 𝑿     (1) 
From (1): 𝒀 − 𝑪𝒀 = 𝑿    (2) 




Inverting (3) gives (the Leontief Inverse): 𝒀 = (𝑰 − 𝑪)−𝟏 𝑿   (4) 
If 𝑴 = (𝑰 − 𝑪)−𝟏 
 in matrix form:  𝜟𝒀 =  𝑴𝜟𝑿   (5) 
4.3 MODEL ASSUMPTIONS 
With respect to the proposed model, there are a few key assumptions which need to be considered: 
The first of these assumptions relate to the determining of the endogenous and exogenous components of the 
model. Ordinarily, the government account is set as exogenous, given that government expenditure is determined 
through policy. For the savings-investment accounts, where there are no dynamic features to a model (as in this 
case), the savings-investment accounts are determined exogenously. Given that the external sector is positioned 
outside of any domestic market control, the rest of the world account will be treated as exogenous. All household 
and production (activities and commodities) accounts will be treated as endogenous in the model. The implication 
here is that factor income generated through production that is transferred to households, re-enters the model in 
form of expenditure. 
The second assumption to the model is two-fold, relating to fixed prices and excess supply. Figure 12 provides a 
graphical representation of these assumptions. When the model is used to assess the post-shock (income injection) 
circulation of income in the economy, the assumption here is that there is excess capacity in all sectors and 
unemployed (or underemployed) factors of production. In cases where capacity constraints are applied to the model,  










Source: Authors own representation 
it is expected that the multipliers will overestimate the total effects of the shock. Where the fixed price assumption 










changes in prices are likely to mitigate the total effects implied by the fixed price model. Cash transfers are likely to 
only stoke inflation when markets are not functioning well enough to accommodate increase demand. Therefore, 
the model assumes that markets can respond appropriately to increases in consumer liquidity. 
The third assumption to the model relates to the reaction of the exogenous components in response to the initial 
income shock. The effects on the exogenous accounts are as a result of the initial shock as well as by changes in the 
leakages from endogenous to the exogenous accounts, as the exogenous accounts as a group become balanced. In 
the model, beyond this no further reactions occur within the exogenous accounts. In practice however, this may not 
be the case. Therefore, multiplier effects are potentially being under-estimated in the model.  
The fourth assumption relates to the propensities, where the income elasticity is considered to be unitary in the 
model. Therefore, the average expenditure propensities are assumed to apply to any incremental income injection. 
Round (2003) and Davies (2007) suggest that while this is indeed an unrealistic assumption, it is largely unavoidable 
in analysis of this nature. It is also considered a standard assumption with respect to multiplier theory. 
4.4 RESULTS & ANALYSIS 
4.4.1 SIMULATION DESCRIPTIONS 
The analysis will present three distribution scenarios for oil revenue-funded cash transfers to Iraqi households. Given 
that there are no price controls, there is the option to make the choice of transfer level arbitrary as it is a linear 
model. However, the previously proposed 25% distribution of oil revenue surpluses (US $200 per capita) will be used 
as reference point. While the level of transfer per capita will differ across all scenarios (given that there will be 
variations in the program design of the transfers), the aggregated transfer to households for all will be equal i.e. 7.13 
trillion ID.  
*The exchange from US $ to ID is based on the official 2011 period average of 1170 ID per US $1.   
Each distribution scenario is specified below:  
1. 234 000 ID (US $200) distributed as a Universal Transfer Program to each citizen in the economy.  
2. 266 305 ID (US $227) distributed to all household quantiles excluding urban and rural quantile 5. This 
scenario is designed to illustrate the impact of a Targeted Transfer Program on the economy. This scenario 
attempts to model the distribution of additional income to all households excluding, the wealthiest 
quantiles in each geographical segment.  
3. 360 454 ID (US $308) distributed to household quantiles with a lower per capita income than 4 500 000 ID 




Transfers Program on the economy, in this case however, specifically the impact on lower-income 
households only.  
In order to simulate the per capita cash transfer using the SAM, the aggregate transfer totals are allocated between 
12 household quantiles. It is important to note that some of the data used to guide these simulations are obtained 
from outside the SAM model. These primarily include academic literature and official government communication 
(reported through various media sources).  Table 6 shows the income and population by representative household 
group. For each representative household group/quantile, the annual household income, population size, average 
household size, annual per capita income and estimated number of households are shown.  The estimated number 
of households is used to calculate the aggregate cash distribution to each household quantile. In each of the 
simulations, the per capita transfer is equal, however given that household sizes differ the total allocated to each 
quantile category will differ. 
TABLE 6: INCOME AND POPULATION BY REPRESENTATIVE HOUSEHOLD GROUP (2011) 
 











RURAL FEMALE HEADED 1.4 0.6 5.7 2488 105263 
RURAL QUANTILE 1 6.5 3.8 9.5 1710 410526 
RURAL QUANTILE 2 4.5 1.9 7.6 2407 250000 
RURAL QUANTILE 3 4.2 1.3 6.9 3370 188406 
RURAL QUANTILE 4 3.7 0.8 6.1 4657 131148 
RURAL QUANTILE 5 3.2 0.4 5.2 7484 76923 
URBAN FEMALE HEADED 10.2 2.3 5.9 4477 389831 
URBAN QUANTILE 1 7.7 3.6 9 2167 400000 
URBAN QUANTILE 2 11.7 4.1 7.7 2861 545455 
URBAN QUANTILE 3 18.4 4.2 7 4350 614286 
URBAN QUANTILE 4 24.2 3.9 6 6177 650000 
URBAN QUANTILE 5 47.6 3.2 5 14649 660000 
TOTAL 143.5 30.1 
 
 4421837 
Source: Debowicz (2013 & 2016), based on 2011 Iraq SAM & IHSES 2007, 2012 
* HHI refers to cumulative Household Income per quantile (per year) 
**PCI refers to the Per Capita Income i.e. per citizen income (per year) in each quantile 
***Estimated Number of Households based on authors approximation = 
𝑷𝑶𝑷𝑼𝑳𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑶𝑵
𝑨𝑽𝑬𝑹𝑨𝑮𝑬 𝑯𝑶𝑼𝑺𝑬𝑯𝑶𝑳𝑫 𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬 (𝑷𝑬𝑹 𝑸𝑼𝑰𝑵𝑻𝑰𝑳𝑬)
 
Table 7 specifies the cumulative transfer level per household quantile in each of the four scenarios. There is an 
important perspective here with respect to the design of the cash transfer. Given that the aggregated transfer to the 
economy is consistent for all scenarios, poorer households benefit disproportionately with targeted programs. 
Indeed, the below table only illustrates the direct effects of the transfer, however the indirect and/or induced effects 
(too be illustrated further on) may also benefit household quantiles who are excluded from the transfers. The direct 




as a share of their initial income. Also, the targeted programs tend to be more effective given that low income 
households (specifically those which are rurally located) tend to spend a greater proportion of their income on goods 
with low leakages (e.g. lower taxes, lower savings, purchase of goods with low import intensity). However, as noted 
by Yeung & Howes (2015) in the case of Mongolia, the cash transfers tend to have no real impact on living standards 
TABLE 7: ANNUAL PER CAPITA CASH TRANSFER PER HOUSEHOLD QUANTILE PER SCENARIO 
 
UNIVERSAL CASH TRANSFER 
(TRILLION ID PER YEAR) 
234 000 ID PER CAPITA 
OIL REVENUE SURPLUS 
(SAVINGS) 
TARGETED CASH TRANSFER 
(TRILLION ID PER YEAR) 
266 305 ID PER CAPITA 
OIL REVENUE SURPLUS 
(SAVINGS) 
TARGETED CASH TRANSFER 
(TRILLION ID PER YEAR) 
360 454 ID PER CAPITA 













% of HHI 
RURAL FEMALE HEADED 0.140 9,70% 0.160 11,10% 0.216 14,96% 
RURAL QUANTILE 1 0.913 13,52% 1.039 15,37% 1.406 20,84% 
RURAL QUANTILE 2 0.445 9,57% 0.506 10,92% 0.685 14,77% 
RURAL QUANTILE 3 0.304 7,06% 0.346 8,00% 0.469 10,88% 
RURAL QUANTILE 4 0.187 5,00% 0.213 5,67% - - 
RURAL QUANTILE 5 0.094 2,89% - - - - 
URBAN FEMALE HEADED 0.538 5,23% 0.613 5,96% - - 
URBAN QUANTILE 1 0.842 10,76% 0.959 12,27% 1.298 16,59% 
URBAN QUANTILE 2 0.983 8,31% 1.118 9,42% 1.514 12,76% 
URBAN QUANTILE 3 1.006 5,46% 1.145 6,23% 1.550 8,42% 
URBAN QUANTILE 4 0.913 3,78% 1.039 4,30% - - 
URBAN QUANTILE 5 0.772 1,64% - - - - 
Source: Authors own calculations 
of wealthier, more affluent citizens (at least through the direct effects). Similarly, in the case of Iraq, Krishnan et al. 
(2017) suggest that for rich households, expenditure on food items subsidized through the PDS constitutes a 
relatively small portion of total food expenditure. Therefore, low-income targeted cash transfer programs are likely 
to be more influential than universal programs. In the case of Iraq, a targeted cash transfer program can also have a 
greater impact on poverty reduction, given that an increase in the level of cash transfer may be distributed to poor 
households. It can also contribute to reducing inequality and income disparities between rich and poor households. 
4.4.2 HOUSEHOLD INCOME EFFECTS (SCENARIO 1, 2 & 3) 
Table 8 is the first of the model simulation results illustrating the changes in household income in each of the three 
distribution scenarios. As described in the model framework, household incomes are impacted through direct, 
indirect and induced effects. In this instance, household incomes are directly increased through the provision of the 
cash transfer; and indirectly through increases in output (increase in factor payments). Figures 13 – 15 graphically 
illustrate the direct and indirect/induced effects per household quantile in each of the three scenario variations. In 
scenario 1, the provision of the cash transfer increases aggregate HHI by 9.26% (13.32 Trillion ID). The 




TABLE 8: HOUSEHOLD INCOME CHNAGES: NOMINAL VALUE (TRILLION ID) & PERCENTAGES 
 












Rural Female-Headed Households 1.44 0.21 14.45% 0.23 15.96% 0.29 20.08% 
Rural Quantile 1 Households 6.75 1.25 18.51% 1.39 20.56% 1.77 26.24% 
Rural Quantile 2 Households 4.65 0.67 14.47% 0.74 15.97% 0.93 20.05% 
Rural Quantile 3 Households 4.31 0.51 11.80% 0.56 12.94% 0.69 16.00% 
Rural Quantile 4 Households 3.74 0.37 10.02% 0.41 10.91% 0.20 5.46% 
Rural Quantile 5 Households 3.25 0.24 7.49% 0.16 4.77% 0.16 4.96% 
Urban Female-Headed Households 10.29 0.97 9.38% 1.05 10.21% 0.45 4.38% 
Urban Quantile 1 Households 7.83 1.17 14.91% 1.29 16.50% 1.64 20.96% 
Urban Quantile 2 Households 11.84 1.47 12.40% 1.62 13.65% 2.03 17.11% 
Urban Quantile 3 Households 18.43 1.77 9.58% 1.92 10.44% 2.35 12.76% 
Urban Quantile 4 Households 24.14 1.91 7.91% 2.06 8.53% 1.05 4.35% 
Urban Quantile 5 Households 47.19 2.79 5.91% 2.07 4.38% 2.13 4.50% 
TOTAL 143.86 13.32 9.26% 13.49 9.38% 13.69 9.52% 
Source: Authors own calculations 
that for each 1 Iraqi Dinar transfer, total HHI rises by a multiple of 1.86 (13.32/7.13). This reflects the importance 
inter-industry linkages in driving the overall results. With respect to these results, there is substantial variation across 
all household categories reflecting the combination of differences in the direct transfer (as a share of initial income) 
FIGURE 13: TOTAL, DIRECT & INDIRECT/INDUCED EFFECTS ON HHI FOR SCENARIO 1 
 
























TOTAL, DIRECT & INDIRECT/INDUCED EFFECTS ON HHI FOR SCENARIO 1




and the importance of indirect effects. As expected, the influence of the direct effects (impact of the transfer) 
decreases as initial HHI increases. The indirect/induced effects of the transfer are reasonably consistent across all 
household groups as well as geographical location. Generally, higher income households would mostly benefit from 
increased consumption, being owners of factors of production. Lower income households benefit primarily through 
increased demand for labour (to meet the increased demands). However, there does appear to be a marginally larger 
indirect/induced effect on rural households. This is attributed to the agricultural expenditure composition of the 
increased consumption, given that agricultural activities are primarily executed in rural regions.   
In scenario 2, the provision of the cash transfer increases aggregate HHI by 9.38% (13.49 Trillion ID). The 
indirect/induced effects account for approximately 47.09% of the aggregate increase in HHI. The effect here is that 
for each 1 Iraqi Dinar transfer, total HHI rises by a multiple of 1.89 (13.49/7.13). It is important to note that while 
the per capita level of the transfer increases, the aggregate transfer remains consistent. There is an important 
perspective here with respect to the outcome of scenario 2, given that the design of the scenario simulates a 
targeted program. Despite the targeted programs excluding certain household groups from a direct increase in their  
FIGURE 14: TOTAL, DIRECT & INDIRECT/INDUCED EFFECTS ON HHI FOR SCENARIO 2 
 
Source: Authors own representation 
income, there are still likely to be benefits accrued to these household groups via the indirect effects, as illustrated 
by the increase in HHI for the excluded household groups in scenario 2 (Rural & Urban Quantiles 5). This again 
highlights the importance of the inter-industry linkages and the multiplier effects of the cash transfer. Across all 
household quantiles, the indirect/induced effects for scenario 2 are larger than those in scenario 1.  It is plausible to 
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also likely to spend a greater percentage of their income and thereby amplifying the multiplier effect. Targeted 
programs may also be preferred given that they are pro-poor in nature and facilitate greater equity in the distribution 
of wealth.  
In scenario 3, the provision of the cash transfer increases aggregate HHI by 9.52% (13.69 Trillion ID). The 
indirect/induced effects account for approximately 47.86% of the aggregate increase in HHI. The implication here is 
that for each 1 Iraqi Dinar transfer, total HHI rises by a multiple of 1,92 (13.69/7.13). In this scenario, the simulation 
focuses exclusively on lower income households, specifically those with an annual per capita income of less than 4.5 
Million ID. In comparison to scenario’s 1 & 2, scenario 3 yields the greatest impact on household incomes, both 
through the direct and indirect/induced effects. The importance of the indirect/induced effects are again highlighted 
here, with these effects being largest for non-recipient household quantiles, in both the rural and urban locations. 
As noted earlier, it is likely that income among these higher-income households is being driven through the increased 
income (and consumption) by recipient households, as the ownership of factors of production (such as land and 
capital) are concentrated among the higher income households.   
FIGURE 15: TOTAL, DIRECT & INDIRECT/INDUCED EFFECTS ON HHI FOR SCENARIO 3 
 
Source: Authors own representation 
The expenditure composition related to the increased level of consumption also provides insight into the factors 
which drive the indirect effects on both rural and urban Female-Headed Households. As to be discussed in Tables 10 
& 11 which follow, the impact of the shock stimulates demand for agriculture products. Al-Haboby et al. (2014) notes 
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active in the agriculture (1st) and service (2nd) sectors. The results therefore suggest that the increased income for 
Rural Female-Headed Households (through the indirect/induced effects) is being driven by the increased demand 
for female labour (unskilled & semi-skilled), owing to the increased demand for agricultural produce. It is plausible 
to suggest that in the case of the Urban Female-Headed Households, increased income could then be driven by the 
increased demand in the services sector. However, given the design of the SAM in consolidating a number of 
accounts under “Other Services”, it is challenging to ascertain precisely which services are driving the increased 
demand in the services sector.  
In analyzing the effectiveness of cash transfers, it is also important to assess the measure of redistribution in each 
of the scenarios.  By their nature, universal transfer programs are redistributive, but not necessarily progressive/pro-
poor. This does not however discredit the effectiveness of the program with respect to its impact on the economy, 
which was shown to be significantly positive. The targeted programs are however both redistributive and pro-poor, 
albeit primarily through the direct effects. The results suggest that the indirect/induced effects tend to be larger for 
higher-income households. As previously discussed, higher-income households being owners of factors of 
production benefit through increased income (& consumption) in the economy. The mutual benefit accrued to both 
recipient and non-recipient households further support the notion that targeted programs are more effective and 
yield greater value to the economy than universal programs.  
4.4.3 WELFARE EFFECTS - REPLACEMENT OF THE PDS WITH CASH TRANSFERS (SCENARIO 4) 
In the current context of Iraq, it can be argued that expenditure on an additional social security program may not be 
feasible or sustainable in the short-term, particularly when considering the large fiscal outlays required for the 
restoration of key infrastructure damaged during the siege of Mosul and other regions by ISIS. Should a policy of 
cash transfers be considered, it may then be more appropriate (at least in the short/medium-term) to consider the 
financing of a cash transfer program with the reallocation of funds from the existing PDS. Indeed, earlier sections 
briefly discussed Iraq’s current position with respect to its PDS and cited a number of studies which have supported 
the need for its reform. Critiques of the Iraqi PDS often highlight the excessive administration costs of the program, 
specifically with respect to the large-scale operations required for procurement, transportation, storage and 
distribution of subsidized food items (Krishnan, Olivieri & Ramadan, 2017). Indeed, the monetization of the PDS 
through cash transfers would significantly reduce the costs of administering the program. It would also potentially 
increase the value-added and multiplier effects in the national economy. 
To assess the welfare effects on Iraqi households from the replacement of the PDS with a cash transfer program, 
scenario four will be introduced. Scenario four will model the net welfare effects on Iraqi households by illustrating 




a) The direct effects of a Universal Cash Transfer program. This will be demonstrated by taking the cumulative 
expenditure on the PDS (6,81 Trillion ID) and distributing this equally to all citizens in each household group 
(an annual per capita transfer of approximately 223 325 ID or US $190); and  
b) The welfare loss (as a % of initial HHI) to each household quantile from the removal of the PDS. This will be 
demonstrated by calculating the implicit reduction in HHI for each household quantile resulting from the 
removal of the subsidy. The method for calculating the implicit reduction in HHI per quantile is as follows:  
(
𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿 𝐻𝑂𝑈𝑆𝐸𝐻𝑂𝐿𝐷 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐸 𝑂𝑁 𝑃𝐷𝑆 𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑀𝑆 (𝐸𝐴𝐶𝐻 𝑄𝑈𝐴𝑁𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐸)
𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿 𝐻𝑂𝑈𝑆𝐸𝐻𝑂𝐿𝐷 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐸 𝑂𝑁 𝑃𝐷𝑆 𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑀𝑆 (𝐴𝐿𝐿 𝑄𝑈𝐴𝑁𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐸𝑆)
) × 𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐸 𝑂𝑁 𝑃𝐷𝑆 
Table 9 illustrates the nominal value and percentage change in HHI per quantile for (a) the implicit reduction in HHI 
associated with the removal of the subsidy; (b) the impact of a cash transfer on HHI and (c) the overall net effect.   
TABLE 9: NET WELFARE EFFECT - REPLACEMENT OF THE PDS WITH CASH TRANSFERS 
 




% Δ HHI Nominal 
(Trillion ID) 
% Δ HHI Nominal 
(Trillion ID) 
% Δ HHI 
Rural Female-Headed Households -0,093 -10,77% 0,134 13,79% 0,041 3,02% 
Rural Quantile 1 Households -0,559 -12,86% 0,871 17,67% 0,312 4,80% 
Rural Quantile 2 Households -0,345 -11,94% 0,424 13,81% 0,079 1,87% 
Rural Quantile 3 Households -0,248 -10,11% 0,290 11,26% 0,043 1,16% 
Rural Quantile 4 Households -0,166 -9,04% 0,179 9,57% 0,012 0,52% 
Rural Quantile 5 Households -0,105 -7,47% 0,089 7,15% -0,015 -0,32% 
Urban Female-Headed Households -0,632 -10,00% 0,514 8,95% -0,118 -1,05% 
Urban Quantile 1 Households -0,594 -11,45% 0,804 14,23% 0,210 2,78% 
Urban Quantile 2 Households -0,852 -11,01% 0,938 11,83% 0,086 0,82% 
Urban Quantile 3 Households -1,009 -9,32% 0,960 9,15% -0,049 -0,17% 
Urban Quantile 4 Households -1,106 -8,43% 0,871 7,55% -0,235 -0,88% 
Urban Quantile 5 Households -1,104 -6,32% 0,737 5,64% -0,367 -0,68% 
TOTAL  -118,70%  130,60%  11,90% 
Source: Authors own calculations 
As previously discussed, ascertaining whether the net effect yields any welfare loss is a key component in 
determining whether the replacement of food subsidies with cash transfers is a viable option. The results show a 
strong positive net effect on the economy, with an overall increase in HHI of 11.90%. An interesting result emerges 
though with respect to the per quantile net effects. There is a relatively strong positive net effect on the lower-
income quantiles (UFH, RQ1, RQ2, RQ3, UQ1 & UQ2), with higher-income quantiles (RQ5, UFH, UQ4, UQ5) primarily 
having a negative net effect, albeit relatively small. It is possible that the effects on the lower-income households 
are likely due to the sensitivity in their HHI, with the cash transfer accounting for a greater share of the initial HHI. It 




necessarily discredit the effect of the cash transfers. The impacts illustrated here do not consider the 
indirect/induced effects of the transfer (through the consumption linkages), which based on the results of scenarios 
1,2 and 3 were shown to be significant, particularly for the higher-income households. It is therefore plausible to 
suggest that the multiplier effects of cash transfers can be expected to have an even greater positive effect on HHI.   
FIGURE 16: NET INCOME EFFECTS FROM PDS REFORM WITH CASH TRANSFERS (SCENARIO 4) 
 
Source: Authors own representation 
It is important to note that the removal of the food subsidies can potentially lead to an inflationary effect for goods 
in the PDS food-basket. However, as will be illustrated in the sectorial output changes (Table 11 which follows), the 
change in consumption patterns are such that the highest growth occurs for goods not previously subsidized through 
the PDS. This would limit the inflationary effect associated with the removal of subsidies and support the notion that 
the provision of cash transfers grants citizens greater autonomy to spend on goods more aligned to individual 
preferences/needs. 
Monetization of the PDS can potentially yield considerable static and dynamic benefits to the Iraq economy 
compared to that of the PDS. However, if the PDS is to be monetized, it must be done with considerable attention 
given to the method of administering the program. This is particularly significant when considering the complexities 
relating to the large numbers of recipients involved and political sensitivity of the proposed transformation. Indeed, 
the advancement of mobile technology in Iraq presents an efficient and cost-effective method with which to 
administer these cash transfers. Various aid organizations who have in the past delivered humanitarian cash 
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(UNFAO, 2017). In addition to this, program design also requires good governance to minimize fraud and corruption 
in the distribution of the funds.  
4.4.4 VALUE-ADDED EFFECTS (SCENARIO 1, 2 & 3) 
Table 10 is a presentation of the value-added changes for scenarios 1, 2 and 3. These results arise from the changes 
in sectoral outputs and the share of the sectoral value-added amounts. Scenario three ranks as the highest change 
in GDP from the three scenarios, with an increase of 3.12%. Scenarios one and two show increases of 2.94% and 
3.02% respectively. Though these results differ in terms of their level, it is important to note however that they again 
support the notion that as a policy, the distribution of oil revenue through cash transfers can potentially be 
economically feasible and beneficial to the economy. As previously discussed, the shock is primarily stimulating the 
TABLE 10: VALUE ADDED CHANGES (GDP): NOMINAL VALUE (TRILLION ID) & PERCENTAGES 
 












Labour Un-Skilled Male 14.34 0.62 4.32% 0.64 4.45% 0.66 4.62% 
Labour Un-Skilled Female 0.96 0.06 6.11% 0.06 6.37% 0.06 6.70% 
Labour Semi-Skilled Male 24.38 1.06 4.33% 1.08 4.44% 1.11 4.57% 
Labour Semi-Skilled Female 0.92 0.04 4.74% 0.04 4.86% 0.05 4.99% 
Labour Skilled Male 20.46 0.97 4.74% 0.99 4.86% 1.02 5.00% 
Labour Skilled Female 6.64 0.31 4.60% 0.31 4.70% 0.32 4.80% 
Capital Agricultural 2.16 0.18 8.34% 0.19 8.83% 0.21 9.53% 
Capital Rest 76.79 0.01 0.01% 0.01 0.01% 0.01 0.01% 
Capital Oil 59.15 2.55 4.31% 2.61 4.41% 2.67 4.52% 
Land 5.49 0.42 7.58% 0.44 7.98% 0.47 8.53% 
TOTAL 211.30 6.21 2.94% 6.38 3.02% 6.58 3.12% 
Source: Authors own calculations 
demand in the agricultural sector, as illustrated by the growth in Land and Agricultural Capital across all three 
scenarios. As discussed earlier, the agricultural sector also has the highest share of active female labour market 
participation. Therefore, the positive effect on agriculture can also be seen by the increased demand for unskilled 
Female Labour. It is important to note that demand in the agricultural sector is also vital for employment (and 
income) for unskilled Labour supply, given that individuals within these unskilled Labour cohorts are likely to be 
confined to the agricultural sector. The increasing participation of females in the labour market is also supported 
from a developmental perspective, with respect to improving gender equality but also for Iraq, in terms of 




4.4.5 SECTORAL OUTPUT EFFECTS (SCENARIO 1, 2 & 3) 
The merits of each transfer scenario can be further appraised based on the sectorial outputs. Table 11 provides a 
representation of the sectorial output changes for each scenario, both in nominal (deviations from the initial/base  
TABLE 11: SECTORAL OUTPUT CHANGES: NOMINAL VALUE (TRILLION ID) & PERCENTAGES 
 












Wheat 14.08 0.79 5.59% 0.81 5.78% 0.84 5.97% 
Barley 3.47 0.19 5.59% 0.20 5.78% 0.21 5.97% 
Paddy 1.82 0.12 6.33% 0.12 6.56% 0.12 6.84% 
Maize 2.21 0.12 5.60% 0.13 5.79% 0.13 5.98% 
Other Grains 0.18 0.02 10.08% 0.02 10.63% 0.02 11.51% 
Tomato 4.19 0.35 8.28% 0.37 8.78% 0.40 9.52% 
Other Vegetables 14.96 1.07 7.13% 1.12 7.47% 1.18 7.89% 
Fodder Crops 4.34 0.50 11.43% 0.53 12.24% 0.59 13.51% 
Legumes 0.12 0.01 11.04% 0.01 11.86% 0.02 12.87% 
Industrial Crops 0.53 0.03 5.59% 0.03 5.77% 0.03 5.97% 
Sesame 0.25 0.01 5.64% 0.01 5.83% 0.02 6.02% 
Other Oil Crops 0.19 0.01 5.58% 0.01 5.77% 0.01 5.96% 
Potato 4.37 0.33 7.66% 0.35 8.11% 0.38 8.77% 
Other Tubers and Bulbs 0.58 0.05 8.85% 0.05 9.43% 0.06 10.27% 
Livestock 12.46 1.42 11.43% 1.52 12.24% 1.68 13.51% 
Crude Oil 94.89 0.01 0.01% 0.01 0.01% 0.01 0.01% 
Other Mining 8.14 0.44 5.36% 0.45 5.55% 0.47 5.74% 
Oil Refining Industry 2.16 0.10 4.63% 0.10 4.66% 0.10 4.76% 
Processed Food 40.45 2.26 5.59% 2.34 5.78% 2.41 5.97% 
Other Manufacturing Industries 8.23 0.34 4.17% 0.35 4.31% 0.37 4.45% 
Electricity and Water 6.53 0.44 6.68% 0.45 6.94% 0.47 7.18% 
Construction 27.70 0.06 0.23% 0.06 0.23% 0.07 0.24% 
Trade, Hotels and Restaurants 26.68 1.18 4.43% 1.23 4.62% 1.30 4.87% 
Transport, Communications and Storage 22.36 1.48 6.63% 1.48 6.62% 1.50 6.71% 
Financial Services and Ownership of Dwellings 4.76 0.21 4.40% 0.21 4.44% 0.21 4.45% 
Other Services 116.55 4.97 4.27% 5.05 4.33% 5.12 4.39% 
TOTAL 422.20 16.52 3.91% 17.04 4.04% 17.71 4.20% 
Source: Authors own calculations 
year values) and percentage terms. Due to the various multipliers, the extent of these deviations varies among all 
sectors. Sectors with highest gains across all scenarios are livestock, fodder crops, legumes and other grains. The 




one and two. This is again attributed to lower-income households spending a greater proportion of additional 
received, therefore leading to a larger multiplier effect. It is important to note however that the quantiles included 
under the targeted program account for almost 70% of the total population. The population concentration under 
the targeted program is likely to be influential in the magnitude of the output changes. An important element to 
highlight here are the changes in livestock production, specifically in scenario three. Bettencourt et al. (2015) finds 
that in developing countries, livestock species play very important economic and socio-cultural role for wellbeing, 
particularly for rural-based households. Livestock are multipurpose assets given that they can generate income, are 
a source of food & means of transport, can contribute to soil fertility, agricultural diversification and sustainable 
agricultural production. Consequently, as disposable income increases and subsequently more livestock acquired, 
so they would require more crops to ensure that the livestock are fed and kept healthy. Therefore, consumption 
patterns would suggest a strong positive relationship between the demands for livestock and fodder crops. 
Output changes on food items are encouraging, which would to an extent, allay fears that cash transfers would not 
be spent on essential food items. In comparison to the PDS, which only makes provision for the distribution of food 
items, providing cash transfers does however give greater autonomy to citizens to spend on other essential items 
such as healthcare and education. Measuring output changes on other essential goods and services is made difficult 
by the design of the SAM which consolidates these under “Other Services”. However, there is evidence to suggest 
that recipients are likely to spend cash transfers on essential goods. Moss & Majerowicz (2013) suggest a tendency 
for the provision of cash transfers to increase expenditure on health, nutrition, sanitation, and education. There is 
also evidence of this in the case of Iraq. After 2014 siege of areas in Iraq by ISIS, aid organizations such as the Cash 
Consortium of Iraq (CCI) delivered emergency assistance to 3,335 households in 2015 and 12,759 households in 
2016, in the form of cash transfers (CCI, 2017). Data collected during the program evaluation show that households 
receiving the cash transfers had the highest expenditures on food, shelter/rent and healthcare. 
Indeed, during crisis periods, it is not unexpected for there to be little to no expenditure on education, given that 
supply is likely to be restricted. It would also not be considered as an immediate priority. However, outside of crisis 
periods, it is expected that education would consume a measure of the cash transfer expenditure. It is important to 
note that while the above consumption patterns are measured during a crisis period, expenditure on essential items 
such as food, shelter and healthcare are not exclusive to crisis periods. Outside of crisis periods however, these 
patterns may change such as increasing/decreasing expenditure of essential items, a measure being allocated to 
savings or even used as collateral to obtain credit through financial institutions.  
There is further evidence to support the notion that cash transfers would not lead to increased consumption on non-
essential goods/temptation goods. A World Bank & Stanford University study by Evans & Popova (2017) examined 
19 studies with quantitative evidence relating to the impact of cash transfers on the expenditure of temptation 




transfers to purchase temptation goods. Almost without exception, the studies found either no significant impact or 
a significant negative impact (where cash transfers led to a reduction in consumption) on temptation goods. Based 
on these findings, it is plausible to suggest that cash transfers would be used by recipients for essential goods, 
thereby meeting the policy’s economic and socio-economic targets. In addition to this, results from the sectoral 
output effects also show notable growth on the consumption of utilities (electricity and water), which would 
reinforce the opinion that cash transfers are likely to drive additional expenditure on essential goods and services.  
An interesting result from these simulations is the impact of the shock on the energy and food subsidies. As 
illustrated in the effects on the Activity and Sales Taxes in appendix C1, C2 & C3 the positive demand shock reflects 
an increase in demand for these subsidized products. This may support a parallel cash transfer and subsidy program, 
at least for the short-term (provided it is affordable). This would allow the government to gradually phase out these 
subsidies, specifically the food subsidies over the medium-to-long term, assuming there is no longer a need for them. 
There are however important considerations for prices with respect to the removal of subsidies. A study by Anand 
et al. (2013) focusing on energy subsidies, finds that implementing cash transfers along with an immediate removal 
of subsidies is likely to undermine the welfare effects of the cash transfers. While the results of scenario four suggest 
welfare gains to the economy when replacing food subsidies with cash transfers, the model does not factor in the 
potential price increases thereof, which would undermine the welfare gains of the cash transfer. It may therefore 
be optimal to consider maintaining the food subsidies, however reforming the design, administration and 
implementation of the program which minimize government’s operational responsibilities (i.e. the administrative 
burdens as earlier discussed) and thereby potentially reducing the expensive logistical costs associated with the 
subsidies. 
Within the current context of Iraq, there are important factors to consider when considering a policy of direct 
distribution. At the time of writing, Iraq had regained control of all territory previously occupied by ISIS. Emancipating 
these areas from the control of ISIS has however come at huge humanitarian and infrastructure costs. As the process 
of rebuilding begins, there is indeed the need for the restoration of basic infrastructure, as well as re-establishing 
social services. However, there is strong emphasis here on ensuring that these expenditures are productive and 
transparent. Moss & Majerowicz (2013) find that large-scale construction is one of the sectors most prone to 
corruption, with Iraq being no exception to this. In addition to this, Dabla-Norris et al. (2011) producing an IMF index 
on the efficiency of public investment, finds that oil exporters are particularly inefficient with respect to public 
investment compared to non-oil exporters.  Furthermore, Sandbu (2012) suggests that the extent of corruption and 
wasteful expenditure is likely to be intensified in post-conflict situations, where critical human, organizational and 
institutional capacity have been fractured (particularly relevant to the current context of Iraq). This link between 
natural resource wealth and poor institutional quality has been discussed in sections of chapter two and three. 
Therefore, while it can be argued that revenues need to be spent solely on public investment, they can also be spent 




4.5 MODEL LIMITATIONS 
When interpreting the results of these simulations, the limitations of the model must be noted: 
Firstly, a strong assumption of the model relates to the absence of any binding constraints i.e. the availability of 
necessary resources and the fixation of prices. However, being a science of scarce resources, basic economic theory 
suggests that constraints are likely inevitable in any economy. Therefore, where supply is constrained, the resources 
required for producing additional quantities of a good can only be made possible by shifting these resources from 
other parts of the economy i.e. an economy-wide reallocation. Consequently, where these underlying assumptions 
cannot be met, prudence must be exercised when analyzing the multiplier effects.  In addition to this, while 
multipliers are practical in analyzing real-side effects of quantity-based shocks, they are not appropriate for 
determining pricing shocks/effects.  
Secondly, Supply constraints also have important implications for inflation.  The cash transfer to citizens will increase 
demand for consumer goods (as shown in the model). Where the local economy is not functioning well enough to 
respond effectively to increased demand, cash transfers could have adverse inflationary effects, potentially stifling 
or even completely eradicating the benefits of cash transfers. There are however ways to mitigate these effects. 
Moss & Majerowicz (2013) suggest that Inflationary pressures can be mitigated through careful monetary policy, 
while supply constraints can be eased by reducing trade barriers (this does however run the risk of reducing the size 
of the multipliers) as well as government providing additional support to underdeveloped sectors, specifically those 
expected to experience substantial increases in demand (assuming these sectors are unlikely to meet the demands).   
Thirdly, the direct relationship between households and production sectors is not observable in a SAM 
(Fathurrahman & Soytas, 2015). Income from production sectors to households are indirectly transferred through 
production factors. Production sectors pay production factors, which in-turn distribute income to household groups. 
As a consequence of this, it is not possible to explicitly determine the precise household income being derived from 
a specific production sector. 
Fourthly, a profound limitation in the use of SAM’s to determine poverty impacts are that the multiplier effects are 
restricted to measuring the income effects of household groups. The intra-group income distributions are not 
generated directly. If it is the case that poverty is explicitly detectable within certain socio-economic groups, then 
these group effects can be informative in this regard (Round, 2003). This is however not the case in the above model. 
Using the IHSES 2007 & 2012 (the same data source used to determine household incomes, The World Bank (2016) 
suggests that the 2011 poverty rate for Iraq to have been just under 20%. However, per capita income for the lowest 
earning household quantile (Rural Quantile 1) indicates earnings that are one and a half times as much as the 2011 
global adjusted poverty line of US $1.90 per day. This paradox immediately suggests huge disparities in intra-group 




Lastly, the intervening period between the development of the SAM model and the current environment in Iraq have 
witnessed significant changes. These include incessant insurgent activity, destruction of oil infrastructure, large-scale 
internal displacement and a high degree of volatility in the oil price. Given that the SAM is not reflective of these 
factors, and without knowing how they may influence the model, the results could misrepresent the potential impact 
of the policy. It can however be argued that these factors may not necessarily be as influential on the potential 
outcomes of the policy. In the case of insurrection, while remnants of these insurgent activities remain, it has for the 
most part been nullified by large-scale security operations. Furthermore, literature suggests that direct distribution 
can also be used as a tool to counter the prevalence of insurgent activity. This is supported by Sandbu (2012), who 
finds that direct distribution (of resource revenues) in conflict-ridden regions can contribute positively towards a 
peacebuilding process. Also, Berman et al. (2011) who studied counterinsurgency measures in Iraq and found that 
poverty and unemployment are often drivers of civilians joining or supporting insurgent activities. Their model 
results found that greater efficiency in the spending of government revenues (through direct distribution, 
improvements in the provision of services etc.) reduces the incidence of insurgent violence/activity.  
In respect of oil infrastructure, while there was a measure of destruction, evidence suggests no disruption to the 
overall level of production. As illustrated in Figure 4 (Chapter 2), the level of production had in fact increased 
significantly between 2013 & 2016, the period during which oil infrastructure had suffered the most damage, as a 
consequence of the military action required to liberate areas occupied by ISIS and other insurgent groups. Production 
has since exceeded 4 million barrels per day and continues to grow steadily with the development of new oil fields. 
In addition to production, volatility in the global oil price has also raised significant concern, particularly during 2016 
where the crude oil price at one point fell as low as US $27.67 a barrel (OPEC, 2016). However, the movement of the 
price began to stabilize and rose significantly between 2017 & 2018, with the 2018 price currently averaging almost 
US $70 a barrel (OPEC, 2018). The current oil price also bodes particularly well for Iraq, considering that the 
forecasted oil revenue for the 2018 Iraqi budget was at an assumed oil price of US $46 a barrel. Therefore, the 
revenue accrued has been significantly higher than forecasted. Also, the use of Stabilization Funds provides an option 
for Iraq to mitigate some of the negative effects associated with these price fluctuations. 
Finally, Internally Displaced Persons (IDP’s) in Iraq has been a chronic problem since the 2003 US-led invasion and 
further exacerbated by persistent insurgent activity, particularly the 2014 ISIS insurgency. However, improvements 
in the security situation in many areas has enabled IDP’s to return to their homes (Benton et al., 2018).  The UN IOM 
reported that approximately 3.2 million IDP’s had returned home at the end of 2017 (UN, 2018).  The concern 
however is that the conditions to which IDP’s return to are often precarious. In this regard, direct distribution may 
also the serve to provide a means for returning persons to access essential goods and services as they face significant 
challenges in the rebuilding process. If, however the prospect of these factors undermining the outcomes of the 
policy still exist, it may then be best suited to only consider the implementation of the policy at a time when there 






This dissertation proposed the use of oil revenue distribution as a policy to counter the high levels of corruption in 
Iraq and studied the economic effects of this policy using SAM-based multiplier analysis. For the better part of its 
existence, Iraq has been considerably wealthy but also recurrently dysfunctional. High levels of corruption, state-
funded patronage networks, weak governance and poor institutional quality have undermined the sovereignty of 
the country’s vast petroleum wealth. Iraq has also had a consistent measure of mismanagement with respect to its 
oil industry, with foreign oil companies and corrupt political factions often exploiting the countries oil resources for 
private gain. Conflicts, both internal and external have also had a negative impact on the oil industry, both on its 
physical operations as well as on the government’s ability to build stronger institutions. Since the 2003 invasion, Iraq 
has been more structured in the management of the oil industry, specifically the relationships with foreign 
companies. While the governance and management of the oil industry is crucial, the biggest challenge yet remains 
how to eradicate the high levels of corruption and patronage networks present within government structures. 
For the better part of the last century, ruling governments in Iraq have exploited the country’s vast oil wealth for 
self-enrichment and the consolidation of power. Under the Saddam Hussain regime, Iraq’s vast oil revenues were 
used to significantly improve social and economic welfare in the country. However, at the same time, it also 
encouraged high levels of corruption, practices of patronage and funded destructive conflicts with both Iran and 
Kuwait. The optimism of a prosperous post-democratic Iraq has rapidly faded with regular outbreaks of ethno-
sectarian conflict, large-scale insurgency movements and a continuation of corrupt practices at a state level. With 
general elections set for 2018, the new leadership in Iraq faces a colossal task in rebuilding areas destroyed by recent 
conflicts, as well as correcting a legacy of wealth imbalances by forming policies which grant civil society greater 
benefit from the country’s vast natural resource wealth.  
While it does have its critiques, there is little doubt that as a policy, direct distribution is supported both theoretically 
and in certain cases empirically. Many of the past literature works suggest that the policy not only has a positive 
economic effect but can also contribute significantly to easing other social and politically orientated tensions. The 
importance of the theoretical model presented is such that it is particularly relevant to real world scenarios. The 
model suggests that in cases where countries do not allocate the investment of public goods efficiently, the returns 
when allocating state funds to direct transfers are greater. These returns are amplified when public institutions are 
weaker and/or there are high poverty headcounts, which incidentally is the case in Iraq. The reviews of past 
experiences with the implementation of this policy suggest a mixture of success and failures. It is important to note 
however that the case of failure is attributed to design, planning and implementation flaws, rather than the impacts 




A SAM analysis was used to model the effects of a policy of direct distribution of oil revenues on the Iraqi economy. 
The analysis tested four scenarios under which direct distribution could be applied to the economy with variations 
in the design of the policy including a universal transfer program, targeted transfer program and replacement of the 
existing food subsidy system with oil revenue-funded cash transfers. Overall, the results illustrate that the policy has 
the potential to yield substantial positive effects to the economy. In each of the model scenario’s, household incomes 
are increased for all quantiles, particularly for lower income households. Targeted transfers programs, which are 
strongly redistributive in nature, do however yield larger effects to household incomes than universal programs. For 
lower-income households these occur directly through the distribution of the transfer, while for higher-income 
households the indirect/induced effects are larger in the targeted programs. It is plausible that higher-income 
households are owners of factors of production and thus acquire additional income from increased 
consumption/expenditure in the economy.  
The income effects of the cash transfer show a strong demand stimulus towards expenditure on agriculturally 
produced goods, as manifested by the growth in demand for female unskilled & semi-skilled labour (which are mostly 
active in the agricultural sector), as well as the demand on agricultural capital and land. The increase in expenditure 
on agricultural produce is also illustrated by the changes in sectorial outputs. The increase in the consumption of 
livestock is the highest among all sectorial outputs, closely followed by fodder crops and legumes, both of which are 
complementary products for livestock. As noted earlier in the study, livestock exist not only as an individual product 
but are also multipurpose in terms of being a source of food, transport and agricultural traction, to name a few. 
These results on the changes in consumption, supported by real-word examples of cash transfer case studies alley 
fears that additional income may be spent on non-essential/temptation goods. Rather it is more likely for additional 
income to be spent on essential goods and services, which in-turn will contribute positively towards stimulating the 
economy.  
5.2 SCOPE FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper which uses a SAM to model economy-wide effects of direct 
distribution/cash transfers in Iraq. As noted earlier in the study, the design of the SAM being used limits the ability 
to ascertain what the effects of the policy could have on expenditure patterns for other essential goods and services 
such as healthcare and education, both of which have been included here under consolidated account for “Other 
Services”. The addition of these as stand-alone accounts would provide greater insight into changes in their 
consumption patterns and their subsequent contribution towards the advancement of developmental indicators in 
the country. A key limitation of the SAM model is the inability to capture the intra-group income distributions, 
thereby hindering the ability to accurately quantify the impact of cash transfers on poverty. It would therefore be 
useful to employ additional methods of poverty analysis to more accurately determine the extent to which cash 
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APPENDIX A: SOCIAL ACCOUNTING MATRIX 
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APPENDIX B: IRAQ SAM SET DESCRIPTIONS 
A_WHEAT Wheat C_MININGO Other Mining 
A_BARLEY Barley C_OILREFIN Oil Refining Industry 
A_PADDY Paddy C_FOODP Processed food 
A_MAIZE Maize C_MANUFO Other Manufacturing Industries 
A_GRAINO Other grains C_ELECWAT Electricity And Water 
A_TOMATO Tomato C_CONSTRUC Construction 
A_VEGETO Other vegetables C_TRADE Trade, Hotels And Restaurants 
A_FODDER Fodder crops C_TRANSP Transport , Communications And Storage 
A_LEGUMES Legumes C_BANK Financial Services And Ownership Of Dwellings 
A_CROPIND Industrial crops C_SERVO Other Services 
A_SESAME Sesame F_LUM Labour unskilled male 
A_OILCROPO Other oil crops F_LUF Labour unskilled female 
A_POTATO Potato F_LMM Labour semiskilled male 
A_TUBBULB Other tubers and bulbs F_LMF Labour semiskilled female 
A_LVST Livestock F_LSM Labour skilled male 
A_CRUDE Crude Oil F_LSF Labour skilled female 
A_MININGO Other Mining F_KA Capital agricultural 
A_OILREFIN Oil Refining Industry F_KAN Capital rest 
A_FOODP Processed food F_KO Capital oil 
A_MANUFO Other Manufacturing Industries F_N Land 
A_ELECWAT Electricity And Water H_R0 Rural Female-Headed Households 
A_CONSTRUC Construction H_R1 Rural Quantile 1 Households 
A_TRADE Trade, Hotels And Restaurants H_R2 Rural Quantile 2 Households 
A_TRANSP Transport , Communications And Storage H_R3 Rural Quantile 3 Households 
A_BANK Financial Services And Ownership Of Dwellings H_R4 Rural Quantile 4 Households 
A_SERVO Other Services H_R5 Rural Quantile 5 Households 
C_WHEAT Wheat H_U0 Urban Female-Headed Households 
C_BARLEY Barley H_U1 Urban Quantile 1 Households 
C_PADDY Paddy H_U2 Urban Quantile 2 Households 
C_MAIZE Maize H_U3 Urban Quantile 3 Households 
C_GRAINO Other grains H_U4 Urban Quantile 4 Households 
C_TOMATO Tomato H_U5 Urban Quantile 5 Households 
C_VEGETO Other vegetables TRC Transaction costs 
C_FODDER Fodder crops GOV Government 
C_LEGUMES Legumes ATAX Activity taxes 
C_CROPIND Industrial crops DTAX Direct taxes 
C_SESAME Sesame MTAX Import taxes 
C_OILCROPO Other oil crops STAX Sales taxes 
C_POTATO Potato DSTK Changes in stock 
C_TUBBULB Other tubers and bulbs S-I Saving-Investment 
C_LVST Livestock ROW Rest of the World 





APPENDIX C1: SCENARIO 1 - DISAGGREGATED IMPACTS FOR OUTPUT, GDP AND INCOME 
 
 
A_WHEAT 0.7871 C_CRUDE 0.0079 
A_BARLEY 0.1937 C_MININGO 0.4386 
A_PADDY 0.1154 C_OILREFIN 0.2175 
A_MAIZE 0.1235 C_FOODP 2.4618 
A_GRAINO 0.0181 C_MANUFO 2.0510 
A_TOMATO 0.3472 C_ELECWAT 0.4424 
A_VEGETO 1.0659 C_CONSTRUC 0.0647 
A_FODDER 0.4962 C_TRADE 1.1813 
A_LEGUMES 0.0136 C_TRANSP 1.4830 
A_CROPIND 0.0294 C_BANK 0.2094 
A_SESAME 0.0144 C_SERVO 4.9725 
A_OILCROPO 0.0107 F_LUM 0.6198 
A_POTATO 0.3348 F_LUF 0.0585 
A_TUBBULB 0.0510 F_LMM 1.0560 
A_LVST 1.4234 F_LMF 0.0438 
A_CRUDE 0.0079 F_LSM 0.9703 
A_MININGO 0.4363 F_LSF 0.3059 
A_OILREFIN 0.1000 F_KA 0.1802 
A_FOODP 2.2616 F_KO 0.0064 
A_MANUFO 0.3432 F_KAN 2.5514 
A_ELECWAT 0.4361 F_N 0.4160 
A_CONSTRUC 0.0637 H_R0 0.2087 
A_TRADE 1.1812 H_R1 1.2501 
A_TRANSP 1.4830 H_R2 0.6726 
A_BANK 0.2094 H_R3 0.5085 
A_SERVO 4.9725 H_R4 0.3746 
C_WHEAT 0.8936 H_R5 0.2436 
C_BARLEY 0.1938 H_U0 0.9654 
C_PADDY 0.1809 H_U1 1.1668 
C_MAIZE 0.1240 H_U2 1.4673 
C_GRAINO 0.0482 H_U3 1.7662 
C_TOMATO 0.3472 H_U4 1.9091 
C_VEGETO 1.2395 H_U5 2.7876 
C_FODDER 0.5329 GOV 0.1642 
C_LEGUMES 0.0136 ATAX -0.1997 
C_CROPIND 0.0294 DTAX 0.5312 
C_SESAME 0.0144 MTAX 0.2070 
C_OILCROPO 0.0604 STAX -0.3808 
C_POTATO 0.3348 S-I -3.1115 
C_TUBBULB 0.0894 ROW 2.9473 






APPENDIX C2: SCENARIO 2 - DISAGGREGATED IMPACTS FOR OUTPUT, GDP AND INCOME 
 
 
A_WHEAT 0.8135 C_CRUDE 0.0080 
A_BARLEY 0.2002 C_MININGO 0.4540 
A_PADDY 0.1196 C_OILREFIN 0.2192 
A_MAIZE 0.1276 C_FOODP 2.5445 
A_GRAINO 0.0191 C_MANUFO 2.1191 
A_TOMATO 0.3681 C_ELECWAT 0.4598 
A_VEGETO 1.1167 C_CONSTRUC 0.0659 
A_FODDER 0.5315 C_TRADE 1.2325 
A_LEGUMES 0.0146 C_TRANSP 1.4792 
A_CROPIND 0.0304 C_BANK 0.2115 
A_SESAME 0.0149 C_SERVO 5.0500 
A_OILCROPO 0.0111 F_LUM 0.6387 
A_POTATO 0.3544 F_LUF 0.0610 
A_TUBBULB 0.0543 F_LMM 1.0825 
A_LVST 1.5246 F_LMF 0.0449 
A_CRUDE 0.0080 F_LSM 0.9949 
A_MININGO 0.4516 F_LSF 0.3123 
A_OILREFIN 0.1008 F_KA 0.1907 
A_FOODP 2.3376 F_KO 0.0065 
A_MANUFO 0.3546 F_KAN 2.6068 
A_ELECWAT 0.4533 F_N 0.4380 
A_CONSTRUC 0.0648 H_R0 0.2304 
A_TRADE 1.2325 H_R1 1.3887 
A_TRANSP 1.4792 H_R2 0.7423 
A_BANK 0.2115 H_R3 0.5578 
A_SERVO 5.0500 H_R4 0.4077 
C_WHEAT 0.9236 H_R5 0.1550 
C_BARLEY 0.2004 H_U0 1.0506 
C_PADDY 0.1875 H_U1 1.2915 
C_MAIZE 0.1282 H_U2 1.6152 
C_GRAINO 0.0509 H_U3 1.9242 
C_TOMATO 0.3681 H_U4 2.0593 
C_VEGETO 1.2986 H_U5 2.0654 
C_FODDER 0.5708 GOV 0.0065 
C_LEGUMES 0.0146 ATAX -0.2074 
C_CROPIND 0.0304 DTAX 0.4964 
C_SESAME 0.0149 MTAX 0.2158 
C_OILCROPO 0.0625 STAX -0.3936 
C_POTATO 0.3544 S-I -3.1723 
C_TUBBULB 0.0953 ROW 3.0546 






APPENDIX C3: SCENARIO 3 - DISAGGREGATED IMPACTS FOR OUTPUT, GDP AND INCOME 
 
 
A_WHEAT 0.8404 C_CRUDE 0.0082 
A_BARLEY 0.2069 C_MININGO 0.4703 
A_PADDY 0.1247 C_OILREFIN 0.2237 
A_MAIZE 0.1319 C_FOODP 2.6287 
A_GRAINO 0.0207 C_MANUFO 2.1872 
A_TOMATO 0.3994 C_ELECWAT 0.4760 
A_VEGETO 1.1803 C_CONSTRUC 0.0670 
A_FODDER 0.5866 C_TRADE 1.3005 
A_LEGUMES 0.0158 C_TRANSP 1.4993 
A_CROPIND 0.0314 C_BANK 0.2118 
A_SESAME 0.0154 C_SERVO 5.1166 
A_OILCROPO 0.0114 F_LUM 0.6621 
A_POTATO 0.3833 F_LUF 0.0642 
A_TUBBULB 0.0592 F_LMM 1.1142 
A_LVST 1.6827 F_LMF 0.0461 
A_CRUDE 0.0082 F_LSM 1.0225 
A_MININGO 0.4679 F_LSF 0.3190 
A_OILREFIN 0.1028 F_KA 0.2058 
A_FOODP 2.4149 F_KO 0.0066 
A_MANUFO 0.3660 F_KAN 2.6738 
A_ELECWAT 0.4693 F_N 0.4683 
A_CONSTRUC 0.0659 H_R0 0.2900 
A_TRADE 1.3005 H_R1 1.7724 
A_TRANSP 1.4993 H_R2 0.9321 
A_BANK 0.2118 H_R3 0.6896 
A_SERVO 5.1166 H_R4 0.2041 
C_WHEAT 0.9542 H_R5 0.1615 
C_BARLEY 0.2070 H_U0 0.4512 
C_PADDY 0.1955 H_U1 1.6407 
C_MAIZE 0.1324 H_U2 2.0253 
C_GRAINO 0.0551 H_U3 2.3520 
C_TOMATO 0.3994 H_U4 1.0494 
C_VEGETO 1.3725 H_U5 2.1257 
C_FODDER 0.6299 GOV 0.0753 
C_LEGUMES 0.0158 ATAX -0.2147 
C_CROPIND 0.0314 DTAX 0.4631 
C_SESAME 0.0154 MTAX 0.2269 
C_OILCROPO 0.0645 STAX -0.4066 
C_POTATO 0.3833 S-I -3.2519 
C_TUBBULB 0.1038 ROW 3.1766 
C_LVST 1.9413   
 
 
